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Plea Bargaining as Contract
Robert E. Scottt and William J. Stuntztt
Most criminal prosecutions are settled without a trial.' The parties to these
settlements trade various risks and entitlements: the defendant relinquishes the
right to go to trial (along with any chance of acquittal), while the prosecutor
gives up the entitlement to seek the highest sentence or pursue the most serious
charges possible. The resulting bargains differ predictably from what would
have happened had the same cases been taken to trial. Defendants who bargain
2
for a plea serve lower sentences than those who do not. On the other hand,
everyone who pleads guilty is, by definition, convicted, while a substantial
minority of those who go to trial are acquitted.3
There is something puzzling about the polarity of contemporary reactions
to this practice. Most legal scholars oppose plea bargaining, finding it both
inefficient and unjust.4 Nevertheless, most participants in the plea bargaining
t Dean and Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
tt E. James Kelly, Jr. Research Professor of Law, University of Virginia.
We wish to thank Ken Abraham, Richard Bonnie, Pam Karlan, Paul Mahoney, John Monahan, Paul
Stephan, George Triantis, and participants in a workshop at the University of Toronto for helpful comments
on earlier drafts. We also thank Alison Grossman for her research assistance.
1. In 1989, 86% of all federal criminal cases were disposed of without a trial. See U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 502 thl. 5.25 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J.
Flanagan eds., 1990) [hereinafter 1990 SOURCEBOOKI]. The same phenomenon occurs in state cases; in 1988,
91% of felony convictions in the 75 most populous counties in the United States were obtained through
guilty pleas. Id. at 526 tbL 5.51.
2. In 1986, among defendants convicted in a state court trial of a serious felony, the average sentence
was 145 months; the comparable figure for defendants who pled was 72 months. The difference in median
sentences for that same year is not as striking, but nevertheless is substantial: the median for those convicted
at trial was 90 months; for those who pled guilty it was 60. U.S, DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF
CRII NAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 517 (Kathleen Maguire & Timothy J. Flanagan eds., 1989).
3. In 1989, the acquittal rate in federal criminal trials was 23%. 1990 SOURCEBOOK, supra note 1, at
502 tbl. 5.25. The rate of acquittal is slightly lower for felony defendants in state court. Id. at 526 tbl. 5.51.
4. The most influential (and prolific) critics are Albert Alschuler and Stephen Schulhofer, both
professors at the University of Chicago. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Plea BargainingDebate,
69 CAL. L. REV. 652 (1981) [hereinafter Alschuler, Changing Debate]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Defense
Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining,84 YALE LJ. 1179 (1975) [hereinafter Aischuler, Defense Attorney's
Role]; Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor'sRole in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50 (1968)
[hereinafter Alschuler, Prosecutor'sRole]; Albert W. Alschuler, The TrialJudge'sRole in PleaBargaining,
76 CoLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1976) [hereinafter Alschuler, TrialJudge's Role]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal
JusticeDiscretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Criminal
Justice Discretion]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Due Process of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733 (1980)
[hereinafter Schulhofer, Due Process]; Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea BargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1037 (1984) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining].But while these two have led the academic
charge (and to a considerable extent shaped the academic consensus), they are by no means alone. For a
representative sample ofthe other scholarship, see MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS ISTHE PUNISHMENT
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process, including (perhaps especially) the courts, seem remarkably untroubled
by it. Not only is the practice widespread, but participants generally approve
of it.5 Why is plea bargaining at once so widely condemned and so widely
tolerated?
One place to look for an answer is in the law and literature of plea bargaining as contract. Plea bargains are, as the name suggests, bargains; it seems
natural to argue that they should be regulated and evaluated accordingly. But
while that argument is common, there is little agreement on where it leads. Two
of the harshest and most influential critics of plea bargaining, Albert Alschuler
and Stephen Schulhofer, maintain that contract theory supports prohibiting any
bargained-for allocation of criminal punishment. 6 The courts, on the other hand,
have proceeded to construct a body of contract-based law to regulate the plea
bargaining process, taking for granted the efficiency and decency of the process
being regulated. The many academic arguments for abolishing (or at least
severely restricting) plea bargaining have thus been largely ignored. It is
tempting to explain this reaction as a product of the chasm between an overly
fastidious academic world and the unpleasant realities of modem criminal
processes. But the intuition that plea bargaining is fundamentally flawed is too
strong and too widespread to be so casually dismissed.
There is a better explanation for the tension between courts and practitioners on the one hand, and theorists on the other: plea bargains are both paradigmatic bargains of the sort we routinely enforce in other contexts and the
product of a seriously flawed bargaining structure. The critics, for their part,
have misused or misapplied classical contract arguments for limiting contractual
autonomy. Properly understood, classical contract theory supports the freedom
to bargain over criminal punishment. At the same time, there are fundamental
structural impediments in the plea bargaining context that may underlie the
widespread antipathy to the practice. These barriers to efficient bargaining are
not, however, grounds for abolition, but instead suggest more focused reforms
of current practices.

(1979); Douglas G. Gifford, MeaningfulReform of PleaBargaining:The Controlof ProsecutorialDiscretion, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37; Kenneth Kipnis, Plea Bargaining:A Critic'sRejoinder, 13 LAw & SoC'Y
REV. 555 (1979); John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining,46 U. CHi. L. REV. 3 (1978).
Opposition to plea bargaining is not limited to academics; much of the public (both in the United States
and elsewhere) disapproves of the practice as well. See, e.g., Stanley A. Cohen & Anthony N. Doob, Public
Attitudes to Plea Bargaining,32 CRIM. L.Q. 85, 93-100 (1989-90) (study finding that large majority
of
Canadians opposes plea bargaining). But there is a major differeice between popular and academic attitudes:
while the academics tend to dislike plea bargaining because it treats defendants unfairly, the public tends
to see the practice as treating defendants too leniently. See id. at 97.
5. The best evidence for this statement is the wonderful book by Milton Heuman, which surveys the
process by which prosecutors, defense attorneys, and judges adapt to plea bargaining. See MILTON
HEUMANN, PLEA BARGArNING (1978). According to Heumann, these actors typically begin with a
strong
distaste for the process, but as they become familiar with it, their view shifts to something between apathy

and strong support.

6. Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 695-703; Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion,
supra note 4, at 70-74.
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In Part I of this Article, we use the perspective of classical contract theory
to evaluate the case for prohibiting plea bargaining. This analysis shows that
none of the standard arguments for limiting contractual autonomy hold in the
plea bargaining context. Those standard arguments focus either on a defective
bargaining process or on systematically unfair or distributionally unjust outcomes. But the contemporary plea bargaining process actually exceeds the
process standards we apply to other sorts of bargaining, and the outcomes,
while far from perfect, are also far removed from the kinds of problems that
would ordinarily lead to a limitation of contractual autonomy.
In Part H, we use the techniques of modem decision analysis and bargaining theory to analyze the strategic interaction of parties to plea bargains. This
approach suggests that the core objection to plea bargaining is not intrinsic to
the relationship, but structural: strategic impediments to efficient bargains lead
to a pooling of guilty and innocent defendants. The pooling phenomenon leads
predictably to innocent defendants being offered (and taking) the same deals
as guilty ones.
In Part III, we consider the implications of this analysis for legal doctrine.
We argue that abolishing plea bargaining would not solve, and might even
aggravate, the problem of failing to separate the innocent from the guilty. But
abolition is not the only possibility-though it is the only one that has received
sustained academic attention. Indeed, the single-minded academic focus on
abolition may have contributed to a second-order problem: the development of
legal doctrine that makes strategic bargaining problems worse rather than better.
By altering the doctrine that governs such issues as when and how bargains are
enforced, the consequences of defendants' mistakes, and how background prices
(i.e., post-trial sentences) are set, the state can reduce the incentives for strategic
bargaining and improve the efficiency and fairness of the plea bargaining
process.
I. PLEA BARGAINING AS CLASSICAL CONTRACT

The criminal process that law students study and television shows celebrate
is formal, elaborate, and expensive. It involves detailed examination of witnesses and physical evidence, tough adversarial argument from attorneys for the
government and defense, and fair-minded decisionmaking from an impartial
judge and jury. For the vast majority of cases in the real world, the criminal
process includes none of these things. Trials occur only occasionally-in some
7
jurisdictions, they amount to only one-fiftieth of total dispositions. Most cases
are disposed of by means that seem scandalously casual: a quick conversation
in a prosecutor's office or a courthouse hallway between attorneys familiar with
only the basics of the case, with no witnesses present, leading to a proposed
7. See, e.g., FEELEY, supranote 4, at 185 & n.9.
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resolution that is then "sold" to both the defendant and the judge.8 To a large
extent, this kind of horse trading determines who goes to jail and for how long.
That is what plea bargaining is. It is not some adjunct to the criminal justice
system; it is the criminal justice system.
The idea of allocating criminal punishment through what looks like a street
bazaar has proved unappealing to most outside observers. Critics point to the
seeming hypocrisy of using an elaborate trial process as window dressing, while
doing all the real business of the system through the most unelaborate process
imaginable. 9 They emphasize the unfairness (and inaccuracy) of determining
defendants' fate without full investigation, without testimony and evidence and
impartial factfinding; they emphasize too how this unfairness disproportionately
harms the poor and unsophisticated. 0 Perhaps especially, they note the seeming pervasiveness of coercion and fraud in the system. Defendants accept
bargains because of the threat of much harsher penalties after trial; they are thus
forced to give up the protections that the trial system's many formalities
provide." And judges ofterx give bargained-for sentences because of what
prosecutors and defense lawyers do not say at sentencing; the sentencing
hearing seems rigged to support the deal that the two attorneys have already
12

struck.
These criticisms often are rooted in the meaning and scope of various
constitutional rights. We do not address such constitutional arguments here. But
attacks on plea bargaining also have their origin in contract, in the norms that
define the boundaries of acceptable exchange elsewhere in the legal system.

8. The most vivid and richly textured descriptions of this process are in HEUMANN, supra
note 5,
passim.
9. E.g., DAvID A. JONES, CRIME wrrHouT PuNISHmENT 111 (1979); Alschuler, Changing
Debate,
supra note 4, at 677-78; Graham Hughes, Pleas Without Bargains,33 RUTGERS L. REV. 753
(1981); John
Kaplan, American Merchandisingand the Guilty Plea:Replacing the Bazaar with the Department
Store,
5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 215, 218 (1977).
10. E.g., Alschuler, Defense Attorney's Role, supranote 4, at 1180; Kenneth Kipnis, Criminal
Justice
and the NegotiatedPlea,86 ErHIcs 93, 105-06 (1976); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Effective
Assistance on the
Assembly Line, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 137, 142, 144 (1986).
11. For two particularly pungent versions of this argument, see Kipnis, supra note 10,
at 97-99
(analogizing a defendant's choice in plea bargaining to threat at gunpoint); Langbein,
supra note 4
(analogizing plea bargaining to medieval torture). For a more measured version of the coercion
criticism,
see Conrad G. Brunk, The Problem of Voluntarinessand Coercion in the NegotiatedPlea, 13
LAW & SOC'Y
REV. 527 (1979).
12. See, e.g., Alschuler, Trial Judge's Role, supra note 4, at 1062-64; David A. Jones,
Negotiation,
Ratification and Rescission of the Guilty PleaAgreement: A ContractualAnalysis and Typology,
17 DUQ.
L. REV. 591, 604 (1978-79); Schulhofer, Due Process,supra note 4, at 745, 753. Heumann's
book, though
not so critical of the institution of plea bargaining, confirms that bargains are essentially
about how to
present the case to the judge, a notion that suggests a certain mount of deception and concealment.
See
HEUMANN, supra note 5, at 38-39, 43-46.
Note that this dynamic has been significantly altered in jurisdictions that have adopted mandatory
sentencing guidelines. See infra notes 181-83 and accompanying text. Sentencing in such jurisdictions
does
not depend on the prosecutor's representations to the same extent as in discretionary sentencing
systems
because the guidelines often dictate a particular sentence. For purposes of our analysis,
we assume a
traditional regime (of the sort that many states still retain) in which the judge has a great deal
of sentencing
discretion.
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Force, fraud, and even distributional unfairness are all grounds for restricting
contract If they are pervasive in the plea bargaining process, then plea bargaining should be abolished-not as a matter of constitutional law, but as a matter
of contract law and contract principles.
That is the argument we wish to investigate. Our analysis proceeds in two
stages. First, we consider whether the powerful norm of expanded choice-the
norm that justifies a general presumption of enforceable bargains-also justifies
enforcing plea bargains. Second, we examine whether any of the recognized
limitations on bargaining autonomy argue for similar limitations in this context
A. The Norm of Expanded Choice
Before marshaling arguments from contract that support limitations on
contractual autonomy, we must first ask why plea bargains deserve a presumption of enforceability in the first place. The answer is simple: the freedom to
exchange entitlements subsumes a freedom to contract for such an exchange.
Either freedom is supported by norms of efficiency and autonomy. Parties who
are denied either freedom to contract or freedom to exchange entitlements suffer
unnecessary constraints on their choices, constraints that undermine the value
of the entitlements themselves. This norm of expanded choice is so powerful
in ordinary contracts that it justifies not only state subsidization of an enforcement mechanism, but also an array of default rules that delineate the terms of
the contractual relationship unless the parties
typical bargains, terms that define
13
alternatives.
own
design their
If the freedom to exchange entitlements were denied altogether in the
allocation of criminal punishment, defendants would not have the option of
pleading guilty in exchange for foregoing the burden and expense of a full trial.
That is, not only plea bargains, but unbargained-for guilty pleas would be
forbidden. Virtually no one argues that such a result would be socially desir-

13. For a more complete analysis of the foundations and limits of the expanded choice norm, see
Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of ExpandedChoice:An Analysis of the InteractionsBetween
Express and Implied ContractTerms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1987). This normative principle has long been
recognized in theoretical welfare economics. See Kelvin Lancaster, Welfare Propositions in Terms of
Consistency and Expanded Choice, 68 EcoN. J. 464 (1959).
The expanded choice norm has been the foundation for the developing theory of default rules in

contract. See. e.g., Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gapsin Incomplete Contracts:An Economic Theory
of Default Rules, 99 YALE LJ. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]; Ian Ayres & Robert
Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729
(1992) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency]; Lucian A. Bebchuk & Steven
Shavell, Information and the Scope of Liabilityfor Breach of Contract:The Rule of Hadley v. Baxendale,
7 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION 284 (1991); Jules L. Coleman et al., A Bargaining Theory Approach to
DefaultProvisionsandDisclosureRules in ContractLaw, 12 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 639 (1989); Richard

Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 MICH. L. REV. 489 (1989);
Jason S. Johnston, Strategic Bargainingand the Economic Theory of ContractDefault Rules, 100 YALE
U. 615 (1990); Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities,18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209 (1989); Robert E.
Scott, A Relational Theory of Default Rules for Commercial Contracts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 597 (1990).
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able; the academic critics are not opposed to pleas, but only to plea bargains.14 But the line between granting defendants the option to plead guilty
to forgo a trial and denying them the option to plead guilty to forgo the risk
of a more severe punishment is far from clear. If the right to select a plea is
an entitlement that can be traded for some purposes, why not for others? And
if defendants may unilaterally exchange this entitlement for certain benefits
under certain circumstances, then what justifies a prohibition on a party's
freedom to contrdct for such an exchange?
The affirmative case for the enforceability of plea bargains is, then, fairly
straightforward. The defendant has the right to plead not guilty and force the
prosecutor to prove the case at trial. The prosecutor has the right to seek the
maximum sentence for the maximum offense that can be proven. It is easy to
imagine some circumstances where each party values the other's entitlement
more than his own."5 If so, the conditions exist for an exchange that benefits
both parties and harms neither. The defendant will trade the right to plead not
guilty and force a trial for the prosecutor's right to seek the maximum sentence.
As with the typical executory contract, the parties to plea bargains do not
actually trade the entitlements per se; instead they exchange the risks that future
contingencies may materialize ex post that will lead one or the other to regret
the ex ante bargain.1 6 Before contracting, the defendant bears the risk of
conviction with the maximum sentence while the prosecutor bears the reciprocal
risk of a costly trial followed by acquittal. An enforceable plea bargain reassigns these risks. Thereafter, the defendant bears the risk that a trial would have
resulted in acquittal or a lighter sentence, while the prosecutor bears the risk
that she could have obtained the maximum (or at least a greater) sentence if
the case had gone to trial. Since it is difficult to know a priori which party
enjoys the comparative advantage in risk reduction, a policy of contractual

14. There are exceptions, but the dominant view is that pleas are not objectionable in themselves. For
example, both Alschuler and Schulhofer defend experiments that continue to permit large numbers of guilty
pleas. Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 726-30 (defending Alaska's limitation on plea
bargaining, but not pleas); Schulhofer, PleaBargaining,supranote 4 (using as model Philadelphia system
in which close to half of defendants pled guilty). And John Langbein, another leading critic of plea
bargaining, extols the virtues of nonadversarial systems in which lawyers play only a small role (and in
which pleas and confessions of some sort play a large role). See John H. Langbein, Land Without Plea
Bargaining:How the Germans Do It, 78 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1979); cf. John H. Langbein, Understanding
the Short History of Plea Bargaining,13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 261 (1979) (arguing that plea bargaining had
its origins in formalization of trial process coupled with ability of defendants to choose jury trials).
15. There are, in general, two quite different reasons why the parties might value each other's
entitlement more: because of asymmetric adjudication costs and because of the different private information
possessed by each party. See infra Part II.
16. The concept of a "regret contingency" is a key element in explaining the circumstances under which

a promisor might fail to perform his promise. The "regret contingency" denotes the future occurrence of
a condition that would motivate breach if breach were a costless option for the promisor. Such an occurrence

implies that either the promisor or the promisee must bear a cost. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott,
Enforcing Promises:An Examination of the Basis of Contract, 89 YALE LJ. 1261, 1273 (1980).
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the social losses that result
autonomy is the only way that parties can reduce
17
expectations.
frustrated
and
uncertainty
from
Moreover, the gains the participants realize from the exchange presumably
have social value, not just value to the bargaining parties. Plea bargaining
provides a means by which prosecutors can obtain a larger net return from
criminal convictions, holding resources constant. Criminal defendants, as a
group, are able to reduce the risk of the imposition of maximum sanctions.
Assuming that these social gains are not achieved at the expense of individual
defendants,18 the system appears normatively acceptable in principle. In short,
the existence of entitlements implies the right to exploit those entitlements fully,
which in turn implies the right to trade the entitlement or any of its associated
risks.
The argument that leads from the initial entitlement to contractual autonomy
can be easily trumped, of course, by simply redefining the entitlement. Thus,
for example, one might say that the right to trial is absolute or inalienable and
therefore not subject to purchase or sale. Alternatively, defendants might be said
to have not a right to trial, but rather a duty or obligation to force the government to prove the charges against them.19 (Prosecutors, by the same token,
might have not the right to seek the maximum sentence, but the duty to do

so. 2 ) Under this conception, the entitlements are located elsewhere-with
society or the larger community-and are not appropriate subjects for individual
trades.
There are several responses to these rights-based attacks on bargaining.
First, the nature of the right to trial argues strongly against a presumption of
17. Parties enter into contractual relationships in order to exploit the benefits of long-term planning
and coordination. Even so, contingencies may subsequently materialize and frustrate parties' efforts to realize
these shared objectives. Anticipating this, contracting parties must distribute the risks of their enterprise
between themselves. Although there are a wide variety of risk-bearing options, all contracting parties have
two dominant motivations. Initially, the parties wish to distribute risks in the least burdensome way.
Thereafter, parties may seek to adjust their initial risk assignments in light of subsequent events. These risk
distribution and adjustment objectives are highly interactive and frequently in conflict. The law's traditional
deference to party autonomy thus seems to reflect the most sensible accommodation of the conflicting goals
that characterize all contractual relationships. See Robert E. Scott, Conflict and Cooperationin Long-Term
Contracts, 75 CAL L. REV. 2005, 2007, 2054 (1987).
18. Or, we should perhaps add, at the expense of the public: one might attack plea bargaining as a
means by which prosecutors, with the collaboration of defense counsel, defraud the citizenry. The public
reaction to the practice--criticizing the lenience that results-might suggest this, but we think it implausible.
First, the alternatives to plea bargaining all require more expense per case, and the expense would be paid
by the public. And while there are indeed serious agency cost problems that make prosecutors (sometimes)
bad representatives of the public interest, those problems would still exist if plea bargaining were abolished;
they would simply be transferred to the decision to charge. For these reasons, we discount the prosecutorial
exploitation view.
19. See Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 678, 691-92 (emphasizing the social benefits
of going to trial).
20. Another way to frame this argument is to say that the socially correct sentences are the ones judges
and juries give, not the ones that prosecutors negotiate. See id. at 680. Schulhofer makes a different (and
more sophisticated) version of this argument when he notes that prosecutors are imperfect representatives
ofsocial interests-in other words, that agency costs seriously infect the criminal justice process. Schulhofer,
Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 4, at 49-53.
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inalienability. There is a tendency to think about pleas as the alternative to the
elaborate trial process that our system presently uses; those who draw the
comparison between pleas and trials, perhaps unsurprisingly, tend to find the
plea process wanting. But the nature of the criminal trial process is not an
independent variable. If plea bargaining were abolished-if, that is, the system
had to process many more cases by trial than it presently does-one might
reasonably suppose that the trial process would be more casual than it is now.
Any change in the structure of plea bargaining will necessarily have far-reaching feedback effects on the trial process itself. In sum, there is no preordained
right to trial at stake in the plea bargaining debate. Rather, there is a choice
between (1) a right (that may be bought and sold) to an elaborate trial, and (2)
an inalienable right to a more casual trial process. 21 For reasons we discuss
below, we think defendants would prefer the former to the latter.
Of course, those who believe in truly inalienablerights might say that party
preferences do not matter. Individual citizens have many rights that they might
prefer to trade yet may not relinquish. Many people might find it welfare
maximizing to sell their right to vote or their right to criticize particular government officials; sales of such entitlements are nevertheless forbidden. Perhaps
the right of a criminal defendant to take his case to trial should be viewed in
the same way.
This argument fails, however, because the right to trial differs in important
ways from those rights that are ordinarily thought to be inalienable. When an
individual sells his vote, the social costs of the transaction are borne by the rest
of the electorate. The same principle applies to sales of the right to criticize
government officials. There are obvious reasons not to permit sales of entitlements where the costs are imposed on third parties. Such is not the case with
the right to trial; the defendant's entitlement is to a process of dispute resolution, and the parties to the bargain are the parties to the dispute. It follows that
the parties do internalize the great majority of the costs and benefits of the
bargain.' Just as there is no inherent conflict between a tort plaintiff's right
to a day in court and his ability to trade that right in settlement negotiations,
there is no inherent conflict between the right to a criminal trial and the ability
to sell that right for sentencing concessions.
The most plausible rights-based objection to plea bargaining is the claim
that the right to trial simply does not belong to the defendant-and, by the same
21. That is why plea bargaining cannot fairly be seen as a straightforward unconstitutional conditions
problem; the trial process is, in effect, a shifting target. Cf. Thomas R. McCoy & Michael J. Mirra, Plea
Bargainingas Due Processin Determining Guilt, 32 STAN. L. REV. 887, 904-10 (1980) (arguing that plea
bargaining appears to fail under traditional unconstitutional conditions standards).

22. The parties do not internalize all the costs and benefits. For example, they do not internalize the
symbolic value of trials--the value of the public spectacle of blame (or exoneration) and punishment. Nor
do they capture the value of the new legal rules that are created through the litigation process. But these
externalities are at least counterbalanced by the fact that the parties also do not bear the full cost of the trial
process-the use of the court system, for example, is not chargeable to either the defense or the prosecution.

1992]

Plea Bargaining as Contract

1917

token, that the government does not own the entitlement to prosecute for the
highest possible charge. One who takes this position will naturally find plea
bargaining objectionable.' Except in unusual circumstances, parties do not
and should not trade entitlements that belong to others with whom they have
no agency relationship. This argument, however, seems inconsistent with many
other features of contemporary criminal procedure. The entire structure of the
criminal justice system presupposes that the relevant entitlements belong, in the
meaningful sense of that term, to the defendant and prosecutor. Defendants are
permitted to plead guilty if they wish, wholly apart from plea bargains; they
are similarly permitted to confess to the police (which can be almost the same
thing as pleading guilty) on their own initiative. Prosecutors are allowed to
decide whom to prosecute, and for what. If our system were based on the
notion that the relevant entitlements are externalized, these bedrock rules would
have to be altered. This form of attack on plea bargaining, in other words, is
really an attack on much else.
Even in rights terms, then, it seems plausible to begin with the presumption
of enforceability, the presumption that flows logically out of the norm of
expanded choice. (And that, of course, is the position that the system has taken
as a matter of positive law: the relevant rights have long been held compatible
with the practice of plea bargaining.) The interesting question is whether the
presumption can be overcome on the ground that the process and/or the product
of plea bargaining is peculiarly defective-that bargains are either reached in
a way that undermines their utility or renders them unfair, or that the bargaining
outcomes are either unjust or socially harmful. These are precisely the kinds
of defects that, under classical contract principles, would override a presumption
of enforcement.

23. One can, however, see a guilty defendant as "owning" his entitlement primarily for the sake of
others and still approve of plea bargaining. One of us has previously argued that many criminal procedure
entitlements should be seen this way: defendants possess and can trade the entitlements, but they possess

them primarily for the sake of others (e.g., the guilty for the innocent). See William 3.Stuntz, Waiving Rights
in Criminal Procedure,75 VA. L. REV. 761 (1989). But even if one sees the right to trial this way-that
is, if guilty defendants possess the entitlement solely for the sake of innocents-guilty people must be treated

as if the right is wholly theirs because it is not possible to differentiate between them and innocent
defendants. Id. at 795-801. In contexts where differentiation is feasible, the analysis changes-that is why,
for example, deception and dishonesty in police interrogation are normatively acceptable, while similar

tactics in plea bargaining are not. Id. at 829-34.
24. Defendants do not technically have the right to plead guilty; the judge may refuse, under some
circumstances, to accept the defendant's plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 nn.10-11

(1970). In the vast majority of cases, however, the decision whether to plead guilty is entirely the defendant's.
25. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). A

contracts perspective not only helps explain this doctrinal conclusion, it arguably provides the reason for
that conclusion. See McCoy & Mirra, supranote 21, at 910 (concluding that decisions rejecting constitutional challenges to plea bargaining "seem[] attributable to an assumption that plea bargaining is merely a

contractual arrangement between a defendant and the state").
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B. The ContractualCase Against Plea Bargaining
While classical contract theory supports a presumption favoring the enforcement of plea bargains, it also is the source of many arguments for prohibiting
plea bargains, or at least substantially restricting them. A decade ago, in one
of a series of famous articles attacking plea bargaining, Albert Alschuler argued
that the practice is contractually deficient in a host of ways: many of the
bargains are unconscionable; defendants accept prosecutors' offers under duress;
the poor and ignorant suffer disproportionately; the bargains are the product
of irrationality and mistake.26 These arguments amount to the basic objections
to plea bargaining stated in contract form.
It might seem strange to look to contract theory to find reasons for prohibiting contracts that allocate criminal punishment, but contract law routinely
embraces arguments for limiting itself.27 Those arguments (and Alschuler's
contract-based criticisms) are of two general types. One class focuses on defects
in the bargaining process. The normative claim that supports enforcing bargains
is that voluntary exchange offers people more choices than they would otherwise enjoy and, other things being equal, more choice is better than less.
Accepting for the moment the appeal of the expanded choice norm, the challenge for contract theory is how to preserve its key elements: a free, informed,
and rational choice. Preserving the core of this idea requires rules that prohibit
enforcement where individual promises were the product of duress or unconscionable information deficits, or where the parties lacked the capacity and
judgment to evaluate the risks being exchanged. 28
A second class of objections focuses more directly on the outcome of
certain bargains. The idea here is that the bargains themselves are faulty,
regardless of whether the bargaining process was rational. Thus, for example,
contracts of enslavement are unenforceable, and some bargains are not enforced
because of socially harmful distributional consequences.
In the following sections, we consider both types of arguments and explore
the various contract analogies just mentioned. In each instance, our goal is to
identify the principle that justifies nonenforcement in contract law and to ask
whether that principle justifies the categorical prohibition of plea bargains.

26. Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4.
27. See, e.g., Duncan M. Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685 (1976); Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalismand the Law of Contract, 92 YALE LJ. 763 (1983).
28. See ROBERT E. Scorr & DOUGLAS L. LESLIE, CONTRACT LAW AND THEORY 469 (1988).
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1. Process-BasedJustificationsfor ProhibitingPlea Bargaining
All of the classical grounds for limiting contractual autonomy have been
marshaled in the contemporary academic debate over plea bargaining.2 9 At the
outset it is important to note that these various arguments have all been used
to support the claim that plea bargaining is socially and morally harmful and
should be prohibited. The contract arguments that focus on bad consequences
are conceptually appropriate for such a claim, but the contract arguments that
center on defective processes are ill-suited for a global critique. Doctrines such
as fraud, unconscionability, and duress assume a regime in which enforcement
is the norm. These doctrines only selectively deny enforceability. Nevertheless,
one can overcome this conceptual hurdle by asking, as we do here, whether the
plea bargaining context is so burdened by process defects as to justify a prophylactic rule prohibiting bargaining altogether.
a. Duress
One of the central arguments for prohibiting plea bargaining is the claim
that such bargains are impermissibly infected by duress.30 Under ordinary
contract principles, a duress defense is successful if the defending party can
prove that he would not have entered into the contract absent the improperly
coercive behavior of the other contracting party.31 At first glance, the defense
seems entirely unproblematic. After all, facilitating the exercise of voluntary
choice is the central normative justification for contractual enforcement. Not
all coercion justifies nonenforcement, however. A poor consumer, for example,
cannot avoid a contractual obligation on the sole ground that his impoverished
circumstances forced him to accept an otherwise "voluntary" agreement. 32 The
duress claim must be based on the acts or conduct of the promisee and not
merely on the necessities of the promisor. The wrongful acts that constitute
duress may be either physical force or an improper threat, but in any case the
compulsion must be "produced" by the promisee and not by exigent circumstances confronting the promisor.33

29. In addition to sources cited supra note 6, see Brunk, supra note 11; Gifford, supranote 4, at 55-61;
Daniel F.Kaplan, Where PromisesEnd: ProsecutorialAdherence to SentenceRecommendation Commitments
in Plea Bargains, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 753-59 (1985); Kipnis, supra note 4, at 561-64.
30. See, e.g., Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 695-703; Brunk, supra note 11, at 542-52;
Gifford, supra note 4, at 55; Jones, supra note 12, at 624-25; Kipnis, supra note 10, at 105-06; Langbein,
supra note 4.

31. See. e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1988); 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH,
CONTRACTS 430-33 (2d ed. 1990); ScoTr & LESLIE, supra note 28, at 395-411.
32. SCOTT & LESLIE, supra note 28, at 395.
33. E.g., Chouinard v. Chouinard, 568 F.2d. 430, 434 (5th Cir. 1978) ("A duress claim ... must be
based on the acts or conduct of the opposite party and not merely on the necessities of the purported victim.
Thus, the mere fact that a person enters into a contract as a result of pressure of business circumstances,
financial embarrassment or economic necessity is not sufficient.").
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The archetypal contracts example of nonactionable "economic duress" is
the lone gas station in the middle of the desert that charges a hundred dollars
for a gallon of gas. The gas station may well get its asking price, because the
difference between that price and the cost of going without is so high. But
contract law has resolutely rejected the buyer's duress argument in such cases,
on the sensible ground that the seller's actions did not produce the constraint
on the buyer's choices (an empty gas tank in the desert), so the buyer was
surely better off with the offer than without it.' Put another way, the norm
of expanded choice is solely concerned with the marginal effects of the contract
on an individual's choices. A person with few and unpalatable choices may live
in a coercive environment. An offer that exploits those circumstances is nevertheless value enhancing, and enforcement is appropriate. More choices are
better, even-perhaps especially-if one has few to begin with.
How does duress, thus conceived, apply in the plea bargaining context? The
duress argument against plea bargaining is that the large differential between
post-trial and post-plea sentences creates a coercive environment in which the
criminal defendant has no real alternative but to plead guilty. No plea produced
35
by that sort of pressure could be deemed voluntary.
There are several responses to this claim. First, the argument about the size
of the sentencing differential reduces to the claim that the choice to plead guilty
is too generous to the defendant, an odd claim to make alongside the general
claim that the system treats the defendant unfairly.30 To be sure, the plea
favors the defendant only because the post-trial sentence is so high. But this
is a complaint about background sentences, not plea bargaining. The problem
of background sentences only implicates plea bargaining (as distinct from
sentencing policy) to the extent that it suggests strategic manipulation by
prosecutors. As we argue below, there is a serious problem with strategic
incentives in plea bargaining, but it would be better solved by specific rules
for combating the prosecutor's strategic behavior than by abolishing plea
37
bargaining.
Moreover, the argument misunderstands the doctrine of economic duress.
As the preceding discussion suggests, coercion in the sense of few and unpalatable choices does not necessarily negate voluntary choice. So long as the posttrial sentences have not been manipulated by the prosecutor, the coercive
elements of the plea bargaining environment do not corrupt the voluntariness
34. See. e.g., Chouinard,568 F.2d 430; Business Incentives Co. v. Sony Corp. of Am., 397 F. Supp.
63, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Standard Box Co. v. Mutual Biscuit Co., 103 P. 938 (Cal. App. 1909); Cheshire
Oil Co. v. Springfield Realty Corp., 385 A.2d 835 (N.H. 1978); Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Distrib. Corp. v.
Cooke, 56 s.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
35. See, e.g., sources cited supra note 30.
36. For a discussion emphasizing this point, see Frank Easterbrook, CriminalProcedureas a Market
System, 121 LEGAL STuD. 289, 311-16 (1983). Alschuler rerponds by acknowledging the argument, and
then simply denying that there is any inconsistency. See Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 659-

60.
37. See infra text accompanying notes 167-83.
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of the plea agreement. 38 A large sentencing differential does not imply coercion a priori. Rather, it is entirely consistent with the assumption that the right
to take the case to trial is a valuable entitlement. The prosecutor gains something very valuable when she avoids trial. It is hardly surprising that she will
pay handsomely for it.
b. Unconscionability
The fact that classical duress does not infect the majority of plea bargains
does not completely answer the coercion claim. The doctrine of unconscionability provides an alternative argument for nonenforceability. That doctrine serves
as a kind of backstop, a means of granting relief where defects in the bargaining process, though serious, do not rise to the level of fraud or duress.39 As
a general proposition, the doctrine of unconscionability "explains and justifies
the limits that should be placed upon the bargain principle on the basis of the
quality of the bargain." Commentators generally agree that this inquiry into
the quality of the bargain has both a substantive and a non-substantive or
procedural dimension. Substantive unconscionability usually refers to the terms
of the agreement itself, such as an "'unreasonable' price or contract term which
deprives a party of the 'essence of his bargain." ' Procedural unconscionability, on the other hand, refers to practices that impermissibly limit a party's
ability to make rational choices about whether to accept the bargain or about
its terms.42
The substantive branch of unconscionability has little relevance for plea
bargaining. 'Iypically, a plea bargain involves a simple promissory exchange:
the defendant trades his promise to plead guilty (and waives his right to trial)
for the prosecutor's promise to recommend a specific sentence. There are no
collateral terms that severely disadvantage the defendant or deprive him of the
essence of what was bargained for. Indeed, the fact that the state delivers the
essence of what was bargained for-a significant sentencing differential-is
what critics of plea bargaining find so troubling. Thus, claims that plea bargains
are generally unconscionable must rest on nonsubstantive or procedural grounds.
In contract law, there are two such grounds: information deficits and market
unresponsiveness.4 3 The paradigmatic case of unconscionable information
38. For the same point expressed in somewhat different terminology, see ALAN WERTHEIMER,
COERCION 122-43 (1987) (arguing that duress requires both psychological coercion and wrongful threat,

and that only the former is present in plea bargaining).
39. Scor & LESLIE, supranote 28, at 455; see alsoRichard A. Epstein, Unconscionability:A Critical
Reappraisal,18 J.L. & EcON. 293 (1975).
40. Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Bargain Principleand its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741, 799 (1982).
41. Scowr & LESLIE, supra note 28, at 69.
42. Id. In general, procedural unconscionability describes a defective bargaining process-an unreasonable failure of one party to inform the other about important aspects of the exchange.

43. Alan Schwartz identifies two other grounds for nonsubstantive unconscinnability: poverty and
incompetence. Alan Schwartz, A ReexaminationofNonsubstantive Unconscionability,63 VA. L. REV. 1053,
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deficits is the fine print boilerplate clause buried in a standard form agreement
that purports to reassign risks in uncustomary ways. As with duress, it is not
enough for the promisor to show that he was uninformed; rather, the information deficit must have been, in some sense, produced by the defendant. 45 Thus,
this most common claim of unconscionability is really a claim of fraudulent
concealment
The information-based argument seems largely inapplicable to the standard
plea bargain. Plea bargains are not standard form adhesion contracts filled with
hard-to-understand terms and conditions. On the contrary, the typical plea
bargain is strikingly similar to the simple dickered bargain-my car for $500that is the staple example of enforceable exchange in contract law. Moreover,
the criminal defendant, unlike the consumer surprised by fine print disclaimers,
has legal counsel. The fact that plea bargaining takes place between lawyers
substantially mitigates any concern with the concealment of relevant information. This is true even in a world in which defendants receive substandard
lawyers (at substandard pay).4 6 Once again, the terms of plea bargains are not
usually complex, so sophisticated analysis is not called for, and its absence is
not usually much of a problem. Moreover, low-quality legal representation
would be more problematic, not less, in a world without plea bargaining, since
the same substandard lawyers would have greater opportunity for error when
conducting criminal trials than when negotiating pleas.47
Nor is there anything unconscionable about a slapdash bargaining process.
It is true that bargains are often reached after only a short conversation between
the prosecutor and defense counsel. 4 But it does not follow that such bargains
are ill-considered or that defendants (or their lawyers) are inadequately informed. Both bargaining agents are typically repeat players who deal with each

1054 (1977). In fact, courts rarely declare a contract or a term to be unconscionable simply because a party
to the agreement is poor or cognitively impaired. In any case, these classes of objections properly fall within
our discussion of paternalistic grounds for nonenforcement. See infra text accompanying notes 60-76.
44. The classic example is Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (NJ. 1960). Though
the decision in this famous case cut much more broadly than necessary-Prosser celebrated it as heralding
the end of the privity requirement in products cases, William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict
Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791, 791-93 (1966)-the facts strongly suggest something
akin to fraudulent concealment: the clause limiting warranty protection was buried in fine print on the back
of the contract.
45. In other words, unconscionability is not a device for transforming ordinary mistakes into excuses
for nonperformance. See, e.g., Merit Music Serv. v. Sonneborn, 225 A.2d 470 (Md. 1967).
46. For attacks on plea bargaining based on the poor quality of most appointed defense counsel, see
Colloquium, Effective Assistance of Counselfor the Indigent CriminalDefendant: Has the Promise Been
Fulfilled?, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHAN E 1 (1986).
47. Even low-quality legal representation provides huge protection against the kind of fraudulent
conduct that makes for genuine unconscionability. The real problem with low-quality defense counsel is
not that prosecutors slip hidden contract terms past them, but that they do a poor job of negotiating the basic
contract term-the recommended sentence. For a discussion of what to do about that problem, see infra
text accompanying notes 160-66.
48. See -EuMANN, supra note 5, at 35; Schulhofer, supra note 10, at 144.
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other and with the system regularly.4 9 This means that the bargaining range
is likely to be both small and familiar to the parties, as both prosecutors and
defense attorneys have a great deal of information about customary practices5 0
Each side, in other words, is likely to have a good sense of the "market price"
for any particular case.51
The second prong of procedural unconscionability rests on the notion of
market unresponsiveness or disparate bargaining power. A product seller or
secured creditor, especially one with market power,52 is believed to have a
great deal of leverage over an individual buyer or debtor. Bargaining power
alone has rarely been sufficient ground for nonenforcement of ordinary contracts.53 Courts have, however, identified a class of contract cases in which
the bargaining power problem can be severe enough to warrant nonenforcement:
standard form, adhesion contracts, with the powerful party forcing the less
powerful counterpart to "take it or leave it."-"
Even assuming the basic soundness of the bargaining power argument, 55
it does not apply to many plea bargains. Plea bargains are often individually
dickered, with terms that are altered by both sides through individualized
negotiations.5 6 And there is a telling reason why this is so-why, that is, plea
49. This is a familiar point that is appropriately emphasized throughout Heumann's account of the
process. HEUMANN,supra note 5.
50. That is, neither side is likely to make large errors in estimation given their familiarity with each
other, similar cases, and the court system.
51. See HEUMANN, supranote 5, at 38-39, 42-43, 120. This is likely to be true whether defense counsel
is privately hired or works for a public defender's office. See Thomas M. Uhiman & N. Darlene Walker,
A Plea IsNo Bargain: The Impact of Case Disposition on Sentencing, 60 SOC. SC. Q. 218, 231 (1979)
(finding no difference in case dispositions between public defenders and private counsel).
52. Of course, where substitutes are readily available, the meaning of bargaining power becomes
unclear, and perhaps unimportant. That is why the famous argument in Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of
Adhesion-Some Thoughts about Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629 (1943)-that whenever
large businesses offer individuals standard form agreements there is a vast disparity in bargaining power-is
wrong. See, e.g., SCOTT & LESLIE, supranote 28, at 67-68; George L. Priest, A Theory of the Consumer
Product Warranty, 90 YALE LJ.1297 (1981); Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in
Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warrantiesand Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387
(1983).
53. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1 (1989) ("The principle is one of the prevention of oppression and
unfair surprise... and not of disturbance of allocation of risks because of superior bargaining power.");
see also Frame v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 97 Cal. Rptr. 811 (1971) (while bargaining
strength was unequal, enforcement of an arbitration clause did not result in unfair imposition); 'ile v.
Southwestern Bell TeL Co., 549 P.2d 903 (Kan. 1976) (disparity of bargaining power alone is insufficient);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcTs § 179 (1988).
54. Note that it is the combination of standard-form contracting and market power that creates the
problem; standard forms alone are not enough. See supra note 52. For representative cases, see Wheeler
v. St. Joseph Hosp., 133 Cal. Rptr. 775 (1976) (superior bargaining position coupled with contract of
adhesion); Weidman v. Tomaselli, 365 N.Y.S.2d 681 (County Ct.) (same), affid, 386 N.Y.S.2d 276 (App.
Term 1975); Seabrook v. Commuter Hous. Co., 338 N.YS.2d 67 (Civ. Ct. 1972) (long and complex lease
printed in small type and containing many highly technical terms).
55. Professors Schwartz and Wide have argued that even given market power, firms will not extract
monopoly rents in the form of one-sided contract terms, but will instead raise prices. See Schwartz & Wilde,
supra note 52. And in the plea bargaining context, prices are monitored by judicial sentencing decisions.
56. The key aspect of successful bargaining for defense attorneys is developing a sense of what a case
is "worth." Without such a sense, the attorney will tend to accept unfavorable prosecutorial offers; with it,
he will dicker successfully for a better deal. See HEUMANN, supra note 5, at 75-78. But cf. Jones, supra
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bargaining has so little in common with the contexts that give rise to paradigmatic adhesion contracts. An individual customer for a mass-marketed good
or service can impose only a small cost on the seller, so that while the seller
may have something very important to offer an individual buyer, that same
buyer does not have something very important to offer the seller. (To put it
differently, the gains from trade in transactions with an idiosyncratic buyer are
dwarfed by the costs of crafting a nonstandard, individually dickered contract. 57) The pressures that motivate the behavior of the seller of mass-marketed goods stem from the market as a whole, not from the need to reach a
bargain with any particular customer. It is this unresponsiveness to individual,
idiosyncratic preferences that underlies standard form, "take it or leave it"
contracts. 58
Plea bargaining is strikingly different. Sentence reductions are not massmarketed precisely because the individual defendant has, in effect, a call on the
prosecutor's time. Each defendant can call on the prosecutor to try the case,
forcing her to use time and effort that would otherwise be spent processing
other cases. For the prosecutor, the opportunity cost of a failure to purchase
this call from any individual defendant substantially exceeds the transaction
costs of negotiating an individualized contract. The defendant's entitlement thus
motivates prosecutors to bargain-notsimply to make offers and walk away.
To be sure, the bargaining dynamic in plea negotiations does not compel the
prosecutor to compromise or to offer any particular defendant a different deal
from those offered to others charged with similar offenses; signaling problems
may limit the prosecutor's flexibility. And as we suggest below, strategic
considerations may well limit the efficiency of the bargaining process in
particular cases. 59 Nevertheless, while it may not be in the prosecutor's interests to offer different deals to different defendants, it is in her interests to
bargain for a deal with each defendant. It is the absence of such individualized
bargaining in other settings that supports claims of unconscionability on the
basis of unequal bargaining power.

note 12, at 628-29 (noting that while some terms, including price, are individually negotiated, other terms
of bargain, such as defendant's waiver of certain legal claims, are treated as nonnegotiable).
57. See Schwartz, supranote 43, at 1064-65.
58. Standard form contracts harm buyers as a whole only when they contain clauses that many buyers
do not want and would pay to avoid. Assuming that buyers are informed and competent, such disfavored
clauses will not existe"sellers would compete for the business of buyers by offering the preferred contract
clauses. Standard form contracts, therefore, can only disadvantage buyers with idiosyncratic tastes in contract
clauses who cannot purchase the terms that they want. Of course, such buyers cannot purchase other product
attributes (such as 12-cylinder automobiles) that are generally disdained or otherwise unpopular. See ALAN
ScHwARTZ & ROBERT E. Scowt, SALES LAW AND THE CONTRACTMG PROCESS 184-85 (2d ed. 1991).
59. See infra Part IL
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c. Incompetency and Poor Judgment (Hereinof Paternalism)
The preceding discussion suggests that the laundry list of complaints raised
by critics of the plea bargaining process is a symptom of a larger and more
fundamental claim: that plea bargaining is simply "unfair" to defendants. Even
if their decisionmaking is informed, and even if bargains are not the product
of fraud or duress, defendants are victimized because they are in general unable
to assess their "true" interests when they bargain with the government. In other
words, abolishing plea bargaining may be justifiable on paternalist grounds.
Legal regulation is often motivated by paternalism, although these motivations are rarely acknowledged. Duncan Kennedy aptly defines paternalism as
the overruling of the preferences of an affected group.' The key to the definition, the point that separates paternalist arguments from distributive or allocative
ones, is that the supposed beneficiaries do not agree that they are better off and,
61
in fact, would prefer to return to the prior regime were they free to do so.
Obvious examples of this sort of regulation include the nonenforceability of
contracts made by infants and incompetents.62 In such cases, the essence of
the paternalist claim-and the source of the prohibition of contracting-is the
assumption of either a cognitive impairment, a volitional impairment, or both.
If the same assumptions can fairly be made in plea bargaining, there is a strong
paternalist argument for aggressive legal regulation, or even outright prohibition.
(i) Cognitive biases
If plea negotiations are peculiarly susceptible to systematic errors of
judgment, then the bargaining process can no longer be trusted to generate an
efficient result. Consider in this connection the now-familiar anchoring phenomenon, which suggests that the way choices are framed affects individuals'
assessments of the gains and losses of exercising any particular option.63
60. Duncan Kennedy, Distributiveand PaternalistMotives in Contract and Tort Law, with Special
Reference to Compulsory Terms and Unequal BargainingPower, 41 MD. L. REV. 563, 624-29 (1982).
61. See Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive CreditorRemedies, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
730, 776 (1989).
62. Id. at 778. In the case of infants and incompetents, nonenforceability rests on an assumption of
immature judgment. See, e.g., Wlliamson v. Matthews, 379 So. 2d. 1245, 1247-48 (Ala. 1980) (incompetence includes inability to reason and exercise judgment); Kiefer v. Fred Howe Motors, Inc., 158 N.W.2d
288, 290 (Wis. 1968) (arguing that minor is immature in both mind and experience and should therefore
be protected from his bad judgments).
63. For the initial discussion of this phenomenon, see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment
Under Uncertainty:Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1128-30 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky &
Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty]. The authors develop the point more fully in Daniel Kahneman
& Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. PSYCHOLOGIsT 341 (1984), and in Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, The Framing of Decisions and the Psychology of Choice, 211 SCIENCE 453 (1981).
One of us has previously discussed the relevance of this literature for legal policymaking. See Robert E.
Scott, ErrorandRationalityin IndividualDecisionmaking:An Essay on the RelationshipBetween Cognitive
Illusions and the Managementof Choices, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 329, 338-42 (1986).
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Criminal defendants may suffer from this type of cognitive error if the benefits
from refusing a proposed plea bargain are anchored to the prospect of acquittal-a prospect that may seem remote when the bargain is struck. Anchoring
the benefits of trial to the remote possibility of acquittal may irredeemably
impair the ability of criminal defendants to evaluate the choice correctly. And
the error will not be random. According to some studies, individuals tend both
to overestimate the likelihood of conjunctive events, such as events leading to
conviction, and to underestimate the likelihood of disjunctive events, such as
acquittal after trial.6 As a result, defendants may not be fully compensated
for their guilty pleas, in which case they presumably would prefer a world
without plea bargaining.
There are three responses to this argument. First, the anchoring phenomenon, like other familiar decisionmaking biases incorporated into the legal
literature, is the subject of serious dispute among psychologists. 65 It would
make little sense to base wide-ranging legal policy judgments on psychological
research that is questionable within its own discipline. Second, decisionmaking
biases are traditionally used to explain seemingly irrationalbehavior--conduct
that appears to cut against self-interest in some important way. Thus, for
example, some scholars have argued that cognitive biases should influence the
legal treatment of product safety risks, because consumers appear to underestimate those risks in their purchasing decisions.6 6 But in the plea bargaining
context, there is no superficial irrationality to explain. Defendants plead guilty
in return for important sentencing concessions. Prosecutors make concessions
in return for substantial savings in time and energy and the elimination of the
risk of acquittal. The bargain appears entirely rational. If the law assumes
cognitive error despite apparently rational behavior by contracting parties
(represented by lawyers no less), the legitimacy of all contracts is called into
question. The cognitive bias argument against plea bargaining thus proves too
much.
Finally, even if the biasing effects of framing are important, there are other
means of correcting for them that do not involve prohibition. Enhanced disclosure and cooling-off periods are the obvious (and familiar) examples from the
law of consumer transactions. 67 Indeed, plea bargaining doctrine already uses
64. Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty, supra note 63, at 1128-30. Interestingly
enough, some have argued that innocent defendants overestimate the likelihood of acquittal at trial. McCoy
& Mirra, supra note 21, at 924.
65. See Gerd Gigerenzer, How to Make CognitiveIllusionsDisappear:Beyond "Heuristicsand Biases,"
2 EUR. REV. SOC. PSYCHOL. 83 (1991) (arguing that most decisionmaking "biases" stem from errors by
testers in presentation of statistical choices). In addition to Gigerenzer's critique, there is both theoretical
and empirical support for the proposition that much seemingly irrational decisionmaking stems from the
adoption of rational precommitment or self-monitoring strategies. See sources cited in Scott, supra note 61,
at 769-70 nn.127-29.
66. See Daniel A. Farber, ContractLaw andModern Economic Theory, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 303,331-33
(1983); Note, Enforcing Waivers in ProductsLiability, 69 VA. L. REV. 1111, 1127-36 (1983).
67. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt.j (1965) (discussing seller's duty to warn
of product dangers); FTC Cooling-Off Period for Door-to-Door Sales Rule, 16 C.FR. § 429.1 (1991).
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these devices to some extent. Judges are typically required to engage defendants
in detailed "plea colloquies" in order to ensure that defendants understand what
they are getting and what they are giving up. 8 And as a general matter, defendants are permitted to rescind bargains up to the time they enter their pleas, as
long as they have not induced substantial detrimental reliance by the government. 9 Most importantly, of course, defendants are given lawyers. 70 These
rules should perhaps be modified or extended, but the point remains: cognitive
biases are not only speculative, but also remediable by measures that fall far
short of abolition.
(ii) Poorjudgment
The possibility of cognitive error does not explain prohibitions against
contracting with infants or incompetents; 71 nor does it justify the nonwaivability of bankruptcy discharge.72 These restrictions are motivated instead by
the idea of human fallibility or poor judgment. The claim is simple: people
sometimes need to be protected from themselves. Certain groups-not only
infants and incompetents, but the poor, uneducated, or unsophisticated as
well-may, in certain settings, lack the capacity to make the choices that, by
some established criterion, they ought to prefer. Infants, for example, are
inclined to recklessness and impulsiveness because, in Kronman's terms, they
lack "moral imagination." 73 This characteristic explains why contract law has
long prevented them from making binding commitments.
When applied to criminal defendants in the plea bargaining setting, this
type of argument has two problems. First, consider the implications of the idea
that poor and unsophisticated criminal defendants (which surely describes a
large portion of those who enter bargained-for guilty pleas) are inclined to
reckless contracting behavior. This proposition predicts that such defendants
will refuse to accept good deals and will instead insist on trials. This disadvantages them, so the argument goes, because post-trial sentences are longer in a
68. See FED R. CRIM. P. 11(c); 5 WEST'S FEDERAL FORMS § 7281 (1971) (form for standard plea
colloquy). For representative state rules mandating plea colloquies, see 17 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 17.2
(1987); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110A, para. 402 (Smith-Hurd 1985).
69. See Jones, supra note 12, at 597-98, 607-09. The same rule applies to prosecutors. See Mabry v.
Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
70. For evidence that lawyers help render plea decisions more rational and less dominated by emotion,
see Jerald W. Cloyd, Prosecution's Power, ProceduralRights, and Pleading Guilty: The Problem of
Coercion in Plea BargainingDrug Cases, 26 Soc. PROBS. 452, 455, 461-65 (1979). On the importance
of all of these legal rules as information-transfer (and hence rationality-enhancing) devices, see Richard P.
Adelstein, The NegotiatedGuilty Plea:A Frameworkfor Analysis, 53 N.Y.U. L. REV. 783, 810-14 (1978).
71. See supra note 62.
72. Thomas Jackson has developed a normative justification for the prohibition on discharge waivers
based on a theory of overeommitment or aberrant judgment. See Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-StartPolicy
in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1393, 1404-24 (1985).
73. Kronman, supra note 27, at 795-96; see also Elizabeth S. Scott, Judgment and Reasoning in
Adolescent Decisionmaking, 37 VILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 1992) (arguing that problem with juvenile
decisionmaking is not lack of cognitive ability, but absence of mature judgment).
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world with plea bargaining than in a world without it. But the evidence (and
much of the criticism) is that defendants usually take the pleas rather than risk
the trials. The vast proportion of guilty pleas, over ninety percent in some
jurisdictions,74 suggests that most defendants, including those who are poor
and unsophisticated, prefer the certain, lower sentence to the post-trial alternative. 75 To be sure, some defendants accept bad deals. But disallowing plea
bargaining in order to prevent that type of error imposes the risk of a much
longer sentence on all defendants in order to protect against the misjudgments
of a few. It is not clear that even the objects of the paternalistic intervention
would be better off.76
There is, to be sure, a form of poor judgment claim that has substantial
appeal in this context. Poor and uneducated defendants are those who most need
good legal advice, yet they probably have the worst lawyers. The defendant's
limited understanding and his lawyer's incompetence may produce an awful
synergy, which in turn may lead to a bad deal. But-and this is the second
problem-abolishing plea bargaining only worsens this situation. Poor people
are indeed disadvantaged in the criminal process relative to rich people, but the
relative disadvantage increases when trials are required. Trials require greater
levels of attorney skill, preparation, and time than plea negotiations. Wealthy
defendants can buy more of these commodities than their poorer counterparts.
That is why legitimate concerns about the quality of counsel poor defendants receive in our system do not justify eliminating plea bargaining. Agency
problems no doubt exist in this context, particularly in cases of appointed
counsel for poor defendants. But the more extended the relationship, the greater
the magnitude of those problems. In a world of constant resources, the level
of justice for the poor and unsophisticated, relative to the level of justice the
rich receive, would decline if plea bargaining were abolished.
2. Outcome-Based Justificationsfor ProhibitingPlea Bargaining
All process-based claims for abolishing plea bargaining run headlong into
two obstacles. First, the plea bargaining process more than satisfies the minimum standards set by contract law for the exercise of contractual autonomy.
Second, any identifiable defects in the bargaining process seem better addressed
by alternative forms of regulation that are more likely than prohibition to
ameliorate underlying inequalities. We turn now to a class of arguments that
might plausibly avoid these obstacles-arguments that plea bargaining ought

74. See supra note 1.
75. On defendants' desire to accept bargained pleas, see HEUMANN, supra note 5, at 70-71.
76. Indeed, the primary beneficiaries of prohibition would be those individuals not charged with crimes
because prosecutors were required to make more selective charging decisions. As we suggest below, this
result is problematic in terms of distributional equity. See infra notes 94-96 and accompanying text.
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to be prohibited not because of flaws in the process, but because of flaws in
the outcomes.
a. Contracts of Enslavement
People cannot make enforceable promises to enslave themselves." If that
familiar restriction on contractual freedom stems from the notion that people
should not bargain away too much of their liberty, it casts a large shadow on
plea bargaining. Not all plea bargains involve jail time, but many do, and those
agreements necessarily involve "sales" by defendants of some portion of their
lives, just as would slavery contracts.7 s
There are, however, two critical features of plea bargains that differentiate
them from contracts of enslavement. First, while the cost of barring slavery
contracts is not high, there are substantial costs to barring consensual allocation
in the plea setting. The point of selling oneself into slavery is to convert
labor-present and future-into money. But labor (even future labor) can be
exchanged for money without enslavement; there is no need to tolerate the
deprivation of liberty that slavery entails in order to achieve the would-be
slave's goal. Moreover, if parties wish to exchange promises of long-term
employment, and bond those promises, they may do SO. 7 9 The law merely
forbids the use of the specific performance remedy. Thus, both the labor-formoney exchange and the bonding mechanism can be achieved without selfenslavementse
Plea bargaining is different. The defendant's liberty is not being traded for
something else; rather, a risk of "enslavement" (prison) is being traded for a
certainty of somewhat less enslavement. This risk cannot be eliminated in any
other way; a defendant who wishes to preclude the possibility of a long sentence can do so only in a system that allows prosecutors to offer shorter
sentences in exchange for eliminating costly trials. Abolishing plea bargaining
would thus force defendants to bear a risk that they find costly to bear.
That leads to the second point. The background entitlements are completely
different in plea bargaining from those in the hypothetical slavery contract. In
the plea setting, the government has a probabilistic entitlement to put the
defendant in jail before the bargain is struck. The proper analogue to the
77. See Kronman, supra note 27, at 775.
78. Alschuler, Changing Debate, supra note 4, at 678-79.
79. One can, for example, create security interests, deferred compensation and pension arrangements,
and the like, all of which serve as bonding mechanisms. See Robert E. Scott, A RelationalTheory of Secured
Financing,86 COLuM. L. REv. 901, 927-30 (1986). Indeed, the fact that such bonding mechanisms were

much harder to create and enforce centuries ago may account for the historical prevalence of indentured
servitude.
80. It follows that most of the people enslaving themselves would be acting irrationally, since they
could achieve what they wanted at much less risk to themselves. As Kronman notes, it is easy to justify
rules that prohibit a few rational self-interested deals in order to prevent many irrational mistakes. Kronman,
supra note 27, at 768-69.
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bargaining defendant is not a free man who sells himself into slavery; it is a
man who might or might not be a slave (but who does not know, because the
issue has not yet been litigated) agreeing to a few years of indentured service
in return for freedom afterward. Forbidding such a bargain condemns the mightbe slave to bear the risk of a lifetime of servitude. And that result cannot be
justified by mere distaste for the prospect of servitude-the problem exists
precisely because enslavement is a permissible outcome. Consequently, if
bearing the risk of long-term "enslavement" is costly (as many defendants
obviously believe), doing away with the bargains is costly as well. 1
b. DistributionalJustice
The rules barring enforcement of slavery contracts rest on concerns about
the results of particular bargains. But contract also has a tradition of nonenforcement for more systemic reasons, based on how contractual allocation
affects the distribution of certain goods and services. A classic example is the
nonwaivability of warranties of habitability. As Kronman has noted, this
limitation on contractual autonomy seems to rest on society's concern about
the distribution of power with respect to fundamental entitlements. 2 Housing,
he maintains, plausibly falls within this category, as do education and health
care, two other fundamental goods that are allocated in part through non-market
mechanisms. If society regulates the distribution of power over these sorts of
entitlements, criminal punishment may warrant the same response.
We do not disagree with this line of argument. Liberty is too important to
be allocated by unregulated bargaining. The potential for irrationality and
mistake to work irrevocable, life-destroying injustice is too high not to police
the bargain. But that is the point-the argument does not imply doing away
with plea bargaining; it only implies regulatingplea bargains to a greater extent
than we regulate other contracts. Kronman's housing example is revealing. The
mandatory warranty of habitability does not amount to a prohibition of landlord-tenant contracts; rather, it is a device for after-the-fact policing of such
3
contracts when the terms seem substantively unfair or one-sided.1
To some extent, the law governing plea bargaining already polices the
bargaining process. Criminal defendants have a nonwaivable entitlement to
challenge the substantive constitutionality of the statute under which they were
81. To be sure, one might say that post-trial sentences-the sentences assigned to those who are
convicted after refusing to plead-would be lower in a world without plea bargaining, so that the size of
the risk being traded is a function of the regime that allows trading to take place. That is no doubt true.
If plea bargaining were abolished, the number of trials would increase, and post-trial sentences would
necessarily fall, given constant resources. But other aspects of the system would change as well, some in
a direction that would increase the risk borne by the defendant facing trial. We discuss these effects at infra

text accompanying notes 87-96.
82. Kronman, supranote 27, at 770-74.
83. In effect, the nonwaivable warranty of habitability permits courts to revise the quality term of the
landlord-tenant contract when that term seems unfair to tenants.
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charged,84 and there may be some other, similarly nonwaivable entitlements
85
(though almost all rights are deemed waived by the plea). But this is a poor
mechanism for correcting inequitable bargains. The potential unfairness in the
typical plea bargain is not that the defendant gives up some legal entitlements,
but that he may not get enough from the government in return. Thus, a Kronman-style distributional justice argument would counsel in favor of letting
judges revise bargained-for sentences (or sentencing recommendations) downward, in defendants' favor. Judges can currently do this, but they do not
exercise the power aggressively. As we discuss below, for a variety of institutional reasons the practice of downward revision ought to be more common
than it is.86 It bears emphasizing, however, that such a practice entails not the
abolition of plea bargaining, but only more intensive judicial scrutiny of
bargaining outcomes.
There is another kind of distributional argument one might make against
plea bargaining, one that focuses on the distribution of punishment among
defendants. Plea bargaining no doubt makes some defendants better off and
some worse off than they would be if bargaining were forbidden. The question
is whether there is any reason to prefer the combination of winners and losers
that plea bargaining generates to the different combination that would be
generated by a no-bargaining regime.

84. This is a reasonable extrapolation from Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975), in which the
Court permitted a defendant to raise a double jeopardy challenge to his conviction even though he had
already pled guilty. For the argument that Menna stands for the proposition stated in the text, see Peter
Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationalefor the Forfeitureof ConstitutionalRights in CriminalProcedure,
75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977).
There is a plausible argument that Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), and its progeny change
this conclusion. Sykes holds that claims that are not timely raised according to the governing procedural
law (meaning in this context any claim that a defendant seeks to raise after an unconditional guilty plea)
can only be raised in subsequent collateral proceedings if there was "cause" for the default, and also if the
default "prejudiced" the outcome. Id. at 86-87, 90-91; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr. & William J. Stuntz,
Ineffective Assistance and ProceduralDefault in Federal Habeas Corpus, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 679, 681-90
(1990) (describing Sykes doctrine). If Sykes applies to all claims, then the Menna exception, as a practical
matter, does not survive. On the other hand, the Supreme Court's retroactivity decisions have stated that
the ordinary rule of nonretroactivity does not apply to doctrine that affects the substantive constitutionality
of the criminal statute that the defendant was convicted of violating. E.g.. Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302,
329-30 (1989). The same exception would likely apply to the Sykes cause-and-prejudice rule.
85. Compare United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563 (1989) (defendants who pled guilty to two
conspiracy charges were not permitted to raise double jeopardy claim that charges were impermissibly
duplicative) with Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61 (1975) (defendant's guilty plea did not constitute waiver
of double jeopardy challenge to entire charge to which plea was entered). At one time, it seemed that a
substantial number of entitlements were not waived by the plea; commentators debated over how the line
was to be drawn. See Stephen A. Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of ConstitutionalRights: The
Current Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265 (1978); Westen, supra note 84. Today, the
category of nonwaivable entitlements appears to be tiny; indeed, it is not clear what it includes, aside from
core double jeopardy objections and the entitlement to challenge the constitutionality of the underlying crime.
See Menna, 423 U.S. at 62-63 n.2. Moreover, procedural default doctrine may, in practice, shrink the
category even further. See supra note 84.
86. See infra text accompanying notes 160-66. It may be worth noting that no one seems to think that
the prosecutor is so powerless that he needs judicial protection on distributional grounds.
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The comparison obviously involves a generous dose of speculation. But
one can safely make four basic assumptions about the effects of abolishing plea
bargaining. First, the number of trials would increase sharply.' Something
in the neighborhood of ninety percent of cases now lead to pleas; if even onethird of those are the result of bargaining, prohibiting plea bargaining would
quadruple the number of criminal trials. Second, the error rate of trials would
rise. This follows from the first assumption. Trials are elaborate and costly
affairs. Any reform that involves a several hundred percent increase in their
number must necessarily involve economizing on the process, at least as long
as one assumes a constant level of expenditures on the system. Reducing the
process, in turn, logically implies increasing the rate of error.88 Third, the total
number of convictions would fall, probably substantially.89 Abolition of plea
bargaining would raise the average cost of prosecution because it would
increase the percentage of cases that go to trial (and even slimmed-down,
cheaper trials will be more expensive than bargained pleas). 9° Given constant
resources, this would mean a drop in the number of convictions. 9 Fourth, the
average sentence would be both higher than the current average bargained-for
sentence and lower than the current average post-trial sentence. This last
proposition follows from the fact that the number of convictions would decline.
If one assumes a constant total level of punishment (meaning no increase in
the number of person-years of incarceration) in order to isolate the effects of
plea bargaining, spreading a given amount of punishment over a smaller number
of defendants means an overall increase in average sentence. At the same time,
without bargaining, there is no need for a "premium" sentence to be awarded
to defendants who go to trial. Thus, no one (or almost no one) would receive
sentences at current post-trial levels.92
87. See, e.g., Thomas Church, Jr., Plea Bargains,Concessions and the Courts: Analysis of a QuasiExperiment, 10 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 377, 383 (1976) (finding sharp increase in trial rates when charge
reduction policy in drug cases was abolished).
88. If this statement is not true, then our current process is absurd, and we should radically alter it,
regardless of what we do about plea bargaining. In order to isolate the effects of plea bargaining, one must
assume that the trial process is rationally constructed.
89. See, e.g., Church, supranote 87, at 390.
90. In the most famous discussion of the alternatives to plea bargaining, Stephen Schulhofer examined
the use of mini-trials, without juries, as a substitute for plea bargaining in Philadelphia. Schulhofer, Plea
Bargaining,supra note 4, at 1062-63, 1083. These trials typically lasted no more than an hour. Id. at 1066.
It is hard to imagine the system tolerating any more casual mode of adjudication than the Philadelphia
trials that Schulhofer observed. But even these require some preparation, and the trial time plainly exceeds
the bargaining time in run-of-the-mill cases. Cf. HEUMANN, supra note 5, at 35 (discussing cases in which
bargaining takes no more than a few minutes).
91. See Adelstein, supra note 70, at 802.
92. Given these assumptions, one can make some rough conclusions about winners and losers. Some
defendants who are now charged would not be because of the decrease in charges filed. They would get
no conviction instead of the current option between a bargained-for low sentence and trial with the
possibility of a higher sentence. These defendants would clearly gain from abolition. The other clear gainers
would be defendants who now refuse to bargain and are convicted at trial; they would receive either the
lower average post-trial sentence, or no sentence at all (depending on whether they were charged). Another
set of defendants, who now do plea bargain, would go to trial, get convicted, and receive a sentence higher
than the bargained-for sentence they currently receive. They would be clear losers, though not by as large
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Given these effects, there are three factors that suggest abolition might be
distributionally less fair than the current regime. First, the defendants who pay
the heaviest penalties under the current regime--defendants who refuse to
bargain, go to trial, and are convicted-at least have the option, ex ante, of
taking a different course of action. The relative losers in a no-bargaining world
have no control over their fate; other forces-prosecutorial charging decisions,
trial error rates-determine whether they fare well or poorly. To the extent
autonomy matters, this should be counted as a cost of abolition.
The second factor concerns the interaction between trial error rates and
prosecutorial charging decisions. Prosecutors do not charge in a vacuum; they
do so against the backdrop of trial. Because defendants always have the option
of forcing a trial, prosecutors have a strong incentive not to press charges in
cases that cannot be won. Because error rates at trial would be higher, convicting innocents would likely be easier in a no-bargaining world (just as convicting guilty defendants would be harder). Thus, the incentives to separate the
innocent from the guilty at the charging stage would be reduced, meaning that
proportionately more innocents would be charged. The reduced cost of trials
in a no-bargaining regime would exacerbate this effect: if going to trial were
less expensive, the risk of losing at trial would be less costly (because of the
reduced opportunity cost), and prosecutors would therefore take fewer precautions against iL93 In the next part, we discuss the problems that plea bargaining poses for innocent defendants. But it is worth noting that prohibiting plea
bargaining would impose additional costs of its own on innocents.
Third, in a world without plea bargaining the average defendant would
depend more heavily on his lawyer's expertise: the percentage of trials would
sharply increase, and lawyers' skill surely matters more in a trial than in a plea
bargaining session, particularly since the latter is likely to be constrained, to
some extent, by customary "market" prices. This effect would be particularly
pronounced in a trial system with a higher error rate than the current one, and
with quicker, more slapdash preparation by the attorneys-a necessary conse-

a margin. Because of the increased error rate of trials, some defendants who are currently convicted would
be acquitted, while others who are now acquitted would be convicted. The gainers and losers in these groups
would presumably be randomly selected. Finally, to the extent that disincentives to criminal behavior depend
more on the certainty of punishment than on its level, e.g., REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF

SCIENCES, DETERRENCE

AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON

CRIME RATES 22 (Alfred Blumstein et a]. eds., 1978) [hereinafter DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION];
George Antunes & A. Lee Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime
in American States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 486, 492-93 (1973); Isaac
Ehrlich, Participationin IllegitimateActivities:A TheoreticalandEmpiricalInvestigation,81 L POL. ECON.
521, 544-47 (1973), there would be some loss of general deterrence, which would fall on the public. This
is because a no-bargaining regime would involve the same total amount of punishment, but punishment
would be distributed in a more concentrated manner.

Whatever one thinks about the incidence of these various effects, we see no principled basis for
preferring the winners from abolishing plea bargaining to the losers.
93. That is, prosecutors would not simply proceed with their strongest cases and drop their weakest

ones, since the incentive to separate strong from weak cases would be reduced.
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quence of vastly increasing the number of trials. The increased impact of skill
differences among attorneys would adversely affect poor defendants, since they
tend to have the worst lawyers. Thus, there is some ground for believing that
a world without plea bargaining would disproportionately harm both the
innocent and the poor, hardly a recipe for a more distributiona~ly just system.
The one large counterweight to these effects is the likelihood that a substantially smaller number of cases would proceed to final disposition. That likelihood implies that the absolute number of innocents who are punished might
decline in a no-bargaining regime, though the proportion of such defendants
would probably rise. But there is a more unpleasant possibility: if low-cost
case-processing methods such as plea bargaining were unavailable, police and
prosecutors might dispense low-level punishment informally, without substantial
legal regulation. Brief detentions incident to arrest might, in some cases, serve
as a substitute for more formal proceedings. This prospect can hardly be a boon
to the innocent. And even if there were an absolute decline in the number of
innocent defendants punished (due to the substantial decline in the total number
of defendants punished), that decline would have its own distributional consequences. The loss of certainty of punishment would lead to a loss of deterrence,' the cost of which would appear as a tax on the citizenry. To be more
precise, it would be a tax on those portions of the citizenry that most feel the
effects of crime-once again, those who inhabit poorer neighborhoods. 95 All
in all, it is hard to argue that these effects would enhance distributional justice,
on any sensible vision of what that phrase means.96
3. Summary
We have tried to show that the objections to plea bargaining as an institution are not grounded in the norms of contract law-at least not as that law is
conventionally understood. Contract norms might justify some constraints, both
to reduce the risks of process defects and to enhance the dignitary values
associated with an exchange involving the entitlement to personal liberty. On
the other hand, classical contract theory plainly supports a presumption in favor
of enforceability.
This conclusion does not, however, lay the debate to rest. The intuition that
drives critics of plea bargaining is worthy of careful scrutiny even if it cannot
94. See infra note 105.
95. See, e.g., Ehrlich, supranote 92, at 545.
96. One of us has suggested an application of superfaimess theory as a criterion for determining
distributional fairness. See Scott, supranote 61, at 782-86. Supsrfairness analysis seeks to measure the equity
or fairness of any particular distribution solely in terms of the preferences of the persons involved. Under
this conception, a distribution is fair if no class of participants would regard its own share as less valuable
than the share received by another group. See WILLIAM L BAUMOL, SUPERFAmRNESS: APPLICATIONS AND
THEORY (1986). Applying the superfairness criterion to the abolition of plea bargaining confirms the intuition
that the losers from the change would envy the distribution received by the winners. In that sense, therefore,
the superfaimess criterion would not be satisfied.
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be grounded in contemporary contract law. In the next part, we approach the
problem from a somewhat different angle (though one that is also grounded in
contract), and look at the plea bargaining dynamic through the lens of bargain
theory.
If. PLEA BARGAINS AND BARGAIN THEORY
The bargain theory of contract has dominated American jurisprudence for
well over a hundred years. Its remarkable durability rests on a single idea:
contracting parties can (and do) reach mutually beneficial agreements that fully
exploit the potential returns from their joint enterprise. 9' But many private
contracts do not fit this simple model. The assumption that contracting parties
will reach mutually advantageous and efficient bargains (so long as transaction
costs are less than the gains from trade) ignores significant barriers to efficient
contracting, barriers found in a wide variety of relationships. Despite the
parties' seeming ability to transact at low cost, strategic considerations may
block the disclosure of necessary information or inhibit the development of the
kinds of credible commitments that are needed for the relationship to go
forward.9"

For a large number of plea bargains, probably the great majority, these
obstacles do not exist, and there is no mystery about what drives the bargain.
Criminal trials are costly for defendants, and even more so for prosecutors.
These costs can be saved, and the gains split between the parties, by reaching
a bargain early in the criminal process. Consequently, in cases where both
parties understand that conviction at trial is virtually certain-a description that
fits many, many cases 9-the incentive to bargain is simple. Savings in adjudication costs represent the gains from trade.
The picture is more complicated, and more interesting, in cases where the
likelihood of conviction is less clear-including, though not limited to, cases
where the defendant is innocent. In this part, we discuss the bargaining dynamic
in such cases, using some of the techniques of modem decision analysis. This
approach yields two key points: (1) parties bargain over the allocation of
criminal punishment in order to reassign and thereby reduce the risks of an
uncertain future, and (2) strategic considerations will often prevent these parties
from reaching an efficient contract that fully exploits potential gains. The first
point supports the argument that a prohibition on plea bargaining would impose

97. See Scott, supra note 17, at 2010.
98. On the idea of strategic barriers to efficient contracting, see Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra
note 13, at 99-104; Ayres & Gertner, Strategic ContractualInefficiency, supra note 13, at 729-46; Charles
J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The MitigationPrinciple:Toward a General Theory of ContractualObligation,
69 VA. L REV. 967, 981-84 (1983); Johnston, supra note 13, at 616-26; Scott, supra note 13, at 608-13.
99. See HEUmANN, supra note 5, at 58, 60-61 (noting that new defense attorneys quickly learn that
most of their clients are not only guilty, but lack any plausible defense).
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net social costs. The second point implies that carefully crafted legal rules are
necessary to lessen the effects of strategic bargaining.
A. The Risk Exchange
The dynamic of plea negotiations is complex. Clarifying the process
requires a good deal of abstraction in order to isolate the most important
variables. To that end, we begin with several simplifying (and artificial)
assumptions. First, we assume that the parties can only negotiate in one of two
periods, T1 and T2. T1 occurs shortly after the charging decision. T2 occurs at
the conclusion of trial, but before the jury has reached its verdict. Second, we
assume that the administrative costs of proceeding to trial are low. Third, we
assume that the probabilities and magnitudes of all exogenous contingencies
(such as risk of a change in the substantive criminal law) will remain constant
throughout both periods. Fourth, we assume that defense counsel perfectly
represents his client's interests, which are defined as the minimization of
punishment. Finally, we assume that the prosecutor's objective is to maximize
punishment.
Given these limiting assumptions, the first question is what the parties stand
to gain by bargaining. The obvious answer is that there may be gains from
reassigning endogenous risks-that is, risks of future events over which they
have some control. This might include, for example, decisions about gathering
additional evidence, interviewing witnesses, and requesting a jury trial. To be
sure, many of the contingencies that will affect the likelihood of conviction are
too uncertain to allow either party to make decent predictions. Still, the parties
can make some assessments because some contingencies are easily foreseeable.
How then might two parties engaged in plea negotiations-Prosecutor (P)and
Defendant (D)-distribute the risk of these foreseeable contingencies?
The key is understanding the nature of the assessments P and D must make.
P knows the initial strength of her case, based on her experience, her judgment,
and the facts at hand. D, meanwhile, knows something of P's case, but not
much, given constraints on discovery.'to On the other hand, D has a major
100. Defendants are not permitted open access to prosecutors' files, though they are permitted some
discovery, and prosecutors must disclose the bare bones of their case. See, e.g., Eleanor J. Ostrow, The Case
for PrepleaDisclosure, 90 YALE U. 1581 (1981). Most important for purposes of plea bargaining, the
police report-the primary source of information for the prosecutor about the case-is not ordinarily
discoverable, except at the prosecutor's discretion. See FED. R. Cpjm. P. 16(a)(2); 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE
& JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.3, at 498-500 (1984). Thus, at the time of settlement
negotiations, a criminal defendant has much less knowledge of the government's case than, say, a civil
defendant has of a civil plaintiff's case against him. While it is true that prosecutors too are limited in their
knowledge of the case at the time of negotiations, prosecutors may have substantial knowledge of matters
that do not appear in the file, such as information picked up through conversations with the investigating
officer.

Some formal analyses of plea bargaining misunderstand this point, and hence proceed from the

mistaken assumption that the nature and quality of the government's case is equally available to the
prosecutor and the defense attorney. See, e.g., Gene M. Grossman & Michael L. Katz, Plea Bargainingand
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piece of information that P does not: D knows whether or not he is guilty. '
Based on the different packages of information each side has, both must
generate an estimate of the likelihood that D will be convicted if the case goes
to trial. That estimate will determine the price that each will insist on as a
condition of reaching a bargain at T1. The probability of conviction is, in turn,
a function of (among other things) two factors: (1) the strength of P's case,
which P knows well but D knows incompletely, and (2) the likelihood that D
is in fact innocent, which D knows but P does not. Though related, these two
factors are distinct. The strength of the case is based upon the evidence available to P from sources other than D. D's factual guilt or innocence depends
on D's own conduct and intent-that is, on historical facts that are only partially revealed by the evidence, but that D typically knows."°
The relevance of this last factor is important, and not altogether obvious.
The likelihood that D will be convicted is (one hopes) strongly correlated with
D's actual guilt or innocence: in general, innocent defendants can more easily
find evidence that exonerates them (or that casts doubt on the government's
theory of the case) than guilty ones can. This is obviously true in cases of
simple mistaken identity, but it is also true in more subtle cases of innocence,
as where D committed the act charged but lacked the requisite mens rea, or
where he has a valid claim of self-defense. One who killed accidentally or in
self-defense may not be able to prove his innocence at the time of charging,
yet there is a substantial likelihood that with enough legwork (and brainwork),
his attorney can make the necessary showing at trial. What D actually did and
thought thus bears powerfully on any prediction about what evidence is likely
to come out during the course of further investigation. And guesses about yetto-be-discovered evidence are in turn critical to the parties' assessments of the
odds of conviction at trial. But P does not know whether D is innocent or
guilty; P knows only what is in her files, together with whatever she may have
picked up through casual conversation with the arresting officer. D, on the other
hand, does know.

Social Welfare, 73 AM. EcoN. REV. 749, 751-52 & n.l1 (1983).
101. This knowledge can take several different forms. D surely knows if the state has charged the
wrong man, since D is aware of his noninvolvement in the crime. But the point also applies to cases in
which D was indeed involved, but lacked the requisite criminal intent, or perhaps has a valid defense to
the charge. In these cases, D may not completely understand his own innocence, because he may not
understand the legal standards against which his conduct and intent are to be measured. But he at least
knows what he did and what he thought when he did it-the historical facts that provide the basis for any

subsequent determination of innocence or guilt.
102. For a formal model of plea bargaining based on this exchange of private information, see Jennifer
F. Reinganum, PleaBargainingand ProsecutorialDiscretion,78 AM. ECON. REV. 713 (1988). Reinganum's
analysis focuses on the effect on plea bargaining of prosecutors' ability to dismiss charges. Her conclusion

is that the prosecutor has substantial incentives to dismiss weak cases rather than take them to trial. We
agree with this conclusion. Our analysis in this part is addressed chiefly to a different set of defendants:
those against whom the prosecutor has a "winnable" case, but who would be acquitted if the judge and jury
had perfect information.
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With these factors in mind, one can begin to see the parties' incentives to
bargain. Start by asking what might cause either party to regret not striking a
deal at T1. In the event that a bargain is not reached, the two sides bear reciprocal risks of price fluctuations. P bears the risk that she has overestimated the
likelihood of conviction-that, when all the evidence is out at T2, the defendant's case will look much stronger, or the government's much weaker, than she
thought at T1. This change would mean a change in the price of the plea, and
obviously, the direction of the change is downward, meaning that P would have
done better to bargain at T1. P thus bears the risk of downward price movement
from T1 to T2. D, meanwhile, bears the opposite risk-that he has underestimated the odds that the jury will convict him; or, in other words, that the government's evidence is more powerful, or his own less so, than he had thought at
T1. This change moves the price of a plea upward. D thus bears the risk of
upward price movement.
The plea bargain at T 1, like any ordinary fixed-price executory contract,
exchanges these risks. Setting the price at T1 means that P would no longer
regret her decision if the price fell from T, to T2. Regret is now triggered only
if the government's case is stronger (or the defendant's weaker) at T2 than she
had guessed at T 1. P thus bears the risk that the price of a plea will rise. The
analysis for D is reciprocal. He now bears the risk that the price will fall, and
thus that he could have gotten a better deal if only he had waited.
Why would the parties wish to exchange these risks? Why would P prefer
to bear the risk of price increasesand D the risk of price declines, rather than
the other way around? The answer is that by shifting the risks of price changes,
those risks will be reduced, and both parties can share in the resulting benefits.
And there are several possible strategies for reducing risk that, singly or in
combination, can motivate P and D to agree to bind their T2 actions with an
agreement at T,.
The first strategy is risk transfer-reducingrisks by reallocating their
consequences. This strategy does not depend on differences in knowledge or
ability to influence events, but on the parties' subjective risk preferences. 3
Suppose that D is risk averse and P is risk neutral. If that is the case, the risk
that future information might cause the T2 price to rise may be more costly for
D to bear than for P, not because P can reduce it, but because she attaches less
cost to bearing it than D. But while this phenomenon may explain some of the
motivation for plea bargains, it is probably not the dominant risk distribution
strategy. The mere fact that P and D have different utility functions does not

103. In this case, the parties attach different subjective values to what is objectively the same risk. If
the risk is not already allocated to the party who places the lowest monetary cost on it, then a transfer to

that party, with appropriate compensation paid to the bearer of the risk, will be mutually advantageous. Risk

transfer thus reduces risk costs when an otherwise unchanged risk is allocated to one party (here P) who,
if only for psychological reasons, places a lower monetary value on the risk. See CHARLEs . GoETz, CAsEs
AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONoMIcs 123-27 (1984).
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necessarily imply a difference in risk preference. Prosecutors, unlike defendants,
can diversify somewhat, and their capacity to do so suggests either risk neutrality or a low level of risk aversion. Defendants, for their part, may have a low
level of risk aversion for other reasons. At least among guilty defendants (surely
the large majority), 104 their out-of-court behavior suggests a form of5 "gambling" that is inconsistent with a strong assumption of risk aversion.tt
But a negotiated bargain at T, can reduce risks even if both parties are risk
neutral. The probability of conviction is determined, in part, by private information controlled (or partly controlled) by each party. Thus, either party can alter
the objective amount of risk that both face. This potential gain to both sides
can be realized if they agree to assign the responsibility for undertaking appropriate precautions to the party best able to influence the magnitude of the
risk.1°6
Using this strategy of risk control, P and D would bargain to assign the
risk of a given price change to the party who has the best access to the kind
of information that might trigger such a change. A major component of the risk
of price decline is D's innocence. Since D knows whether he is innocent, he
is well positioned to guard against overly high assessments of the likelihood
of conviction. Thus, the risk of price decline is less if borne by D than if borne
by P. Similarly, the principal risk of a price increase derives from new facts
that enhance the strength of the case. As the party who controls investment in
the strength of the case, P can better avoid unanticipated increases in the
probability of conviction.
It is tempting to argue that the risks are reciprocal, so that neither party can
systematically benefit from shifting them. If this were so, the risk of a price
decline could not be meaningfully reduced if borne by P, nor could D predictably control the risk of a price increase. This argument erroneously assumes,
104. Of course, it is impossible to know what proportion of defendants are factually guilty. We do
know, however, that between three-fourths and four-fifths of those who go to trial are convicted. From that
and other figures, one can fairly surmise that a large portion, probably a large majority, of those who plead
guilty would have been convicted had they gone to trial.
For an interesting attempt to get to the bottom of this question, see MICHAEL 0. FINKELSTEIN,
QIJANTITATIVE METHODS IN LAW 265-83 (1978). Finkelstein analyzed the relationship between guilty pleas
and overall nonconviction rates; his analysis yielded the conclusion that, in federal courts in the 1970's,
at least one-third (but clearly less than half) of those who pled guilty would have been acquitted at trial.
Id. at 280. The analysis suggests different conviction rates for different time periods, however, it is not clear

what rate would apply to typical state jurisdictions today.

105. That is why, according to the conventional wisdom, certainty of punishment is more important
than the level of punishment. See Daniel Nagin, General Deterrence:A Review of the EmpiricalEvidence,
in DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION, supra note 92, at 95-111 (summarizing the data); sources cited supra
note 92. Note that this risk preference is, in itself, a strong argument in favor of plea bargaining: if criminals
tend to be gamblers, cost-effective deterrence is likely to require apprehending a large portion of them, rather
than punishing a few at much higher rates. Plea bargaining allows the system to maximize the number of
defendants who receive punishment, because it minimizes the unit cost of prosecution by amortizing the
expense of each trial over 10 or more cases.
106. For an elaboration of this argument, see Charles J. Goetz& Robert E. Scott, LiquidatedDamages,
Penaltiesand the Just CompensationPrinciple,77 COLUM. L. REv. 554, 578-83 (1977); see also GOEZ,
supra note 103, at 127.
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however, that at T1 the risks of conviction and acquittal are approximately the
same. But, of course, this is not the case. Since T occurs after the charging
decision has been made, the risk of conviction is substantially greater than the
risk of acquittal: about three-fourths of trials yield convictions, and for every
trial there are eight to ten guilty pleas."° The key question is whether D has
a comparative advantage in reducing the risk of a marginal decline in the
probability of conviction. And he does, since his private information cuts more
heavily in one direction-toward acquittal-than the other. Similarly, P's
private information, which is linked to P's investment in preparing her case,
disproportionately affects the post-charging probabilities of conviction. Thus,
P is able, by controlling her investment in the case, to bear at less cost the risk
of any increase in price from T, to T2.
In sum, exchanging risks of price fluctuations reduces those risks. This is
a powerful theoretical justification for the claim that a bargain between P and
D at T1 can generate net social gains. The next question is whether strategic
bargaining problems impair the information exchange between P and D, and
thereby distort T1 bargains in a way that might undermine this optimistic
assessment.
B. The Problem of InformationDeficits
Thus far, we have assumed that if P and D reached a deal at T1, the bargain
would fully exploit the potential gains from risk reduction. That assumption is
a common one in many contexts: where gains from trade exceed transaction
costs, the parties can generally reach an efficient allocation of risks and entitlements. But the assumption of efficient contracting breaks down where the
contracting parties cannot reliably exchange important information." 8 In this
section, we explore a particular obstacle to information exchange, an obstacle
that tends to generate mistakes and bargaining breakdown, especially in cases
involving innocent defendants.
1. Plea Bargainingwith Costly Adjudication and Full Information
We begin by relaxing one unrealistic assumption-that going to trial is not
very costly-and introducing two others: (1) each party can costlessly evaluate
the truthfulness of the other's statements, and (2) rules against misrepresentation

107. See supra notes 1, 3.
108. See Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 13, at 97-107; Robert Cooter, The Cost of
Coase,
11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 20-24 (1982); Scott, supra note 17, at 2031-39. In the economics literature,
the
problem of asymmetric information inducing inefficient contracting was first established by
George A.
Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 QJ.
EcoN. 488
(1970); see also Roger B. Myerson, Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal,51 ECONOMETRICA
1767

(1983).
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can be costlessly enforced. These moves are designed to expose the role of
adjudication costs and information exchange in shaping plea bargains.
The significance of adjudication costs is fairly clear. As we saw in Part
9
1 D has a call on P's time. The decision to go to trial is not simply a lost
bargain for P; it imposes a substantial cost in time and energy. To put it
differently, adjudication costs are both high and disproportionately allocated
to prosecutors. Prosecutors bear the burden of proof and therefore must invest
110
more in digging out and presenting evidence. Defendants have a lesser
burden of producing evidence; moreover, they often do not internalize their own
cost of legal representation.'
The point of assuming free information exchange, meanwhile, follows from
our discussion in the last section. The defendant's knowledge of what he did
and thought-that is, his knowledge of whether he is guilty or not-is a good
predictor of future evidentiary discoveries, and hence powerfully relevant to
whether he will be acquitted or convicted. Prosecutors would thus like to know
this information, whether or not they are altruistically concerned with avoiding
injustice. Here, we ask how the parties would accommodate this desire if they
could. We can then discuss the barriers to disclosure that prevent them from
doing so.
Note the effects of these assumptions on P's bargaining strategy. First of
all, asymmetric adjudication costs mean that P's reservation price is lower than
it would be otherwise.' In other words, the sentencing differential-the gap
between the sentence offered at T, and the sentence imposed after trial and
conviction-must be large enough to reflect P's costs. Introducing adjudication
costs into the dynamic thus raises the cost of going to trial (or, in relative
terms, lowers the price of a plea) to D.13 For the same reason, adjudication
costs explain why the parties might reach a bargain even in cases where both
sides are virtually certain that the defendant will be convicted at any subsequent
trial and have a good idea what the resulting sentence will be. Because adjudication costs are disproportionately visited on prosecutors, prosecutors will offer
pleas at a price that allows defendants to share in some of the cost savings.
But in a world of full information, prosecutors have a strong incentive to
vary the prices they charge. Remember that P is not competing with other
prosecutors for customers; rather, she is trying to generate the optimal number

109. See supra text accompanying notes 55-58.
110. Thus, it is possible for defendants to win without putting on a "case" of their own, and in all but
a very small number of cases, the government's case is more elaborate and extensive than the defense.
I11. The defendant has still another advantage: he may be a more efficient evidence-gatherer. he has
a comparative advantage in knowing where to look for evidence since he knows what he did.
112. For a formal analysis and proof, see David Rosenberg & Steven Shavell, A Model in Which Suits

Are Broughtfor Their Nuisance Value, 5 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985). The central idea is that where

one side's litigation costs are higher than the other's, and where both sides know of the disparity, the
difference in litigation costs should be incorporated into the settlement price.
113. The cost of going to trial is thus inversely related to the price of pleading.
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of pleas among the defendants assigned to her.11 4 In order to do that effectively, she must take account of the probability of conviction at trial. That is, she
must offer different prices to defendants who are fairly likely to win at trial
than to defendants who are sure to lose. These different prices would then
induce innocent defendants to reveal the key private information-their historical knowledge-that determines, in part, the value of the bargain. In other
words, D, if innocent, has every reason to signal that fact to P, and P has every
reason to pay attention to the signal.
Naturally, guilty defendants would like to take advantage of the price
difference, and would thus try to copy the signal. But in a regime where lies
can be costlessly detected, P can easily prevent this kind of behavior simply
by punishing misrepresentation. The innocent and the guilty will be perfectly
separated in the bargaining process.
Note that this is true even if (1) trials sometimes convict innocent defendants, and (2) prosecutors are wholly unconcerned about whether such defendants get punished. We have assumed that P does not in fact care whether D
is innocent, but cares only about maximizing punishment at minimum expense.
Most real-world prosecutors would dismiss charges in response to a verifiable
claim of innocence from a defendant. Our point is that, given full information,
even selfish and amoral prosecutors have an incentive to take innocence (or the
possibility of innocence n S) into account in bargaining.
2. Introducing Information Barriers
In the real world, prosecutors cannot costlessly test defendants' claims of
innocence, nor can they costlessly punish false claims. This has a powerful
effect on P's pricing strategy. P still has market power and can still set prices
according to different defendants' willingness to pay. But now P has a problem
if she offers a different price to defendants who claim innocence than to
defendants who do not: the latter category will disappear.'1 6 Guilty defendants, faced with two prices for pleas-a high probability of conviction/high
price and a low probability/low price-will opt for the lower one. If innocence
claims are not costly (because false claims are hard to detect definitively, and
114. This means P can price discriminate without fear of being undercut by a competitor, since
there
are no direct competitors.
115. It is worth emphasizing that the analysis holds true even if defendant's claim is only incompletely
verifiable-that is, if the prosecutor can know only that there is a higher-than-random likelihood
that the
defendant is innocent.
116. Kenneth Mann notes that the reverse phenomenon occurs in white-collar cases. Defense
counsel
in white-collar cases often enter the picture during the investigation, before final charging decisions
have
been made. Any initiation of plea bargaining by suspects durirg this stage is taken by the government
as

a signal that the suspect must be guilty of something, and hence should be charged. The consequence is
that defense
lawyers say and do nothing to indicate that they might expect charges to be filed until the
charges actually are filed (or are certain to be). KENNETH MANN, DEFENDING WHrrE-CoLLAR CRIME
14-16
(1985).
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expensive to punish), and if such claims generate a better deal for defendants,
all defendants will say they are innocent. In order to overcome this problem,
one of two things must happen: either prosecutors must devise some screening
mechanism for testing innocence claims, or innocent defendants must devise
some method of signaling their innocence.
In some circumstances, the trial itself might function as the necessary
screen. If innocent defendants are never convicted, then the rational bargaining
strategy for innocent defendants is to insist on dismissal of all charges. That
should simply refuse to bargain, since going to trial would
is, such defendants
117
risk-free.
be
Unfortunately, trials make mistakes. Some innocent defendants-no one
knows how many-are convicted. And since prosecutors have some incentive
to proceed only with cases they can win, any innocent defendant faced with
formal charges must consider the possibility that he might lose at trial. This
would not be disabling if guilty and innocent defendants had the same level of
risk aversion. Were that the case, P could offer a high probability/high price
contract that only guilty defendants would accept. But that is probably not the
case. We noted earlier that defendants as a class are unusually prone to risk
taking. That statement is true of guilty defendants: a criminal history suggests
a preference for gambling, just as it suggests that the defendant fears punishment less than most people. But risk aversion is a much more plausible assumption where innocent defendants are concerned (especially those with relatively
clean records).118 Given a higher level of risk aversion among innocent defendants than among guilty ones, the high price/high probability contract will often
prove attractive even to the innocent.
Although the need to find some separating mechanism remains, the obvious
possibilities do not work. P might wish to have an enforceable side contract
that would deter false claims, so that if D were later shown to have lied, he
could be severely punished for it. D, if innocent, might wish to enter into such
a contract in order to bond his claim. But the side deal is too costly to enforce.
Proving that D lied amounts to proving D guilty of the offense; in other words,
it amounts to taking the case to trial. Thus, even with the side deal, P must
choose whether to agree to a plea or (functionally) go to trial, without knowing
whether D's claim of innocence is true. This problem might be surmounted by
raising the penalty for lying: if false claims of innocence at the bargaining stage
were punishable by death, one might be able to deter false claims. But stating
the scheme explains why it is impossible. The punishment must be set so high

117. This is the basic insight of Grossman & Katz, supra note 100. They show that, given a sufficiently
high likelihood of acquittal of innocent defendants at trial and given certain assumptions about risk
preferences, plea bargaining itself functions as an effective device for separating innocent from guilty
defendants, because innocent defendants always find it in their interest to insist on going to trial.
118. For anecdotal support for this proposition, see Alschuler, Changing Debate, supranote 4, at 685,
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that it would conflict with basic criminal law norms of proportionality. The
system would be unwilling to carry out such harsh threats, and the threats
themselves would soon become empty.
3. ExtralegalResponses to Information Barriers:Reputation and Other
SignalingMechanisms
There are other ways for parties to reduce the cost of acquiring reliable
information from each other. A party might, for instance, use an established
reputation to bond his claims, if the reputation suggests that he lives up to his
word. n 9 In the plea bargaining context, the past record of the defendant can
serve this function, though only in a negative sense. If D is charged with armed
robbery, a substantial record of burglary and robbery charges and convictions
might be a reliable signal that D should get the high price/high probability of
conviction contract. Evidence of a bad reputation would signal that D's innocence claim can be substantially discounted. 120 The problem is that the signal
fails to screen those whose past records are clean. In other words, the ability
to screen for a bad reputation has no bearing on establishing a good reputation.
Among the pool of defendants who have no prior record, some will be innocent
and some guilty, and the prosecutor has no a priori means of separating the
wheat from the chaff.
Other methods of extralegal signaling are even more suspect. For example,
a common method of signaling reliability in commercial contracts is "labeling"--making assumptions based on fixed characteristics of other parties that
can be easily observed when the interaction begins. Janet Landa has shown the
value of labeling for ethnically homogeneous Chinese middlemen who rely on
immutable characteristics such as familial identity and dialect.121 Other commercial parties form trade associations that promulgate ethical norms for
contracting behavior.122 And parties sometimes adopt territorial strategies,
using patterns of bargaining with "neighbors" as a substitute signaling technique.l 23 None of these devices can be relied upon by prosecutors and defendants to overcome their information barriers.
119. If the market for contracting partners is thick, each party has a positive incentive to establish a
reputation for credibility and work to engage in future contracts. The key in a well developed market,
therefore, is the ability of each party to choose a partner. See Gordon Tullock, Adam Smith and the
Prisoners' Dilemma, 100 QJ. ECON. 1073 (1985). In the "thin" market like the one that operates in plea
bargaining, the choice among partners is limited and reputation is a less potent method of signaling
credibility. See Goetz & Scott, supra note 98, at 1013.
120. Moreover, P can fairly conclude that even in the unlikely event that D is innocent of the crime
charged, he has almost certainly committed many comparable offenses that have gone undetected. Thus,
even ifP is concerned about minimizing injustice, he should perhaps disregard worries about D's innocence
in these cases.
121. Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An Institutional
Alternative to ContractLaw, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 358-60 (1981).
122. Scott, supra note 17, at 2033.
123. ROBERT M. AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 158-68 (1984).
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P and D could conceivably signal the reliability of private information by
using transaction-specific devices. Commercial parties often solve the problem
of trust by offering to pledge assets as collateral for a promise that representations are reliable. 1" Alternatively, the relevant party can agree to pay a substantial monetary penalty in the event of breach. Neither of these common
strategies are available in most plea settings, since most defendants lack the
assets needed to make the strategies work.
4. Norms, Ethics, and Other Substitutesfor Signaling
Scholars have long recognized that group norms and individual ethics can
play an important role in regulating contractual relationships. In many commercial environments, norms such as honesty, promise-keeping, trust, and solidarity
reinforce the credibility of contractual commitments.'2s These norms may add
more value than legal enforcement But the plea bargaining context is not well
suited to this method of bonding representations. For group norms to work, the
contracting parties must share the same norms. Not only are criminal defendants
likely to be more heterogeneous than other groups of contracting parties, but
defendants as a class reject the norms of trust and promise-keeping in their
relations with prosecutors. Since bargaining takes place very early in the
process, the prosecutor cannot know whether any particular defendant is
trustworthy; if there is no effective penalty for lying, she must treat all claims
of innocence as false.
One might think defense counsel could help solve this problem. Lawyers
are classically attentive to group norms, and in this setting, the same lawyers
tend to deal with each other in many different cases, which adds to the incentive to adhere to whatever values or norms the group finds useful. But there
are two obstacles to using defense counsel to bond a defendant's claims. First,
the defendant's lawyer typically knows little more than the prosecutor about
the defendant's trustworthiness. The second obstacle only aggravates the first.
In any system that used defense lawyers to screen good from bad claims of
innocence, guilty defendants would abandon candor with their lawyers-as
many do anyway.1" Thus, the trustworthiness of the defendant's lawyer cannot convince the prosecutor of the trustworthiness of the defendant's claim of
innocence.
124. See Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and the State ofNature, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORGANIZATION
5, 12-15 (1985).
125. See Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic and Sociological Theories of Social Control,
16 3. LEGAL STUD. 67, 92-93 (1986). See also Stewart Macaulay's classic study of contractual behavior
among business firms. Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractualRelations in Business: A PreliminaryStudy, 28
AM. Soc. REV. 55, 63 (1963).

126. See HEUMANN, supra note 5, at 59-60. As one of the defense attorneys Heumann interviewed
stated: "The first year you practice law you believe everything your client tells you. The second year you
practice, you believe everything that the other side tells you. The third year you don't know who's telling

the truth. Most people tend not to believe their clients that much, justifiably." Id. at 59.
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5. Signaling by Refusal to Bargain
An innocent defendant does have one available device for signaling innocence: he can refuse to accept the high price/high probability-of-conviction
contract, saying, in effect, "I'll take my chances at trial." It is tempting to
regard this refusal as an effective indicator, since the defendant has the comparative advantage in knowing what as-yet-undiscovered evidence will come out
at trial. If his estimation of the probability of conviction is lower than the
prosecutor's reservation price, the defendant may well be innocent.
The problem, again, is that the prosecutor cannot prevent guilty defendants
from copying the signal. If innocent defendants refuse to bargain and prosecutors respond by making low price/low probability-of-conviction offers, guilty
defendants will respond, in turn, by being initially intransigent in order to
secure the same deal for themselves. For essentially the same reason, the
prosecutor cannot offer a menu of variable sentences after substantial trial
preparation has gone forward. That approach would lead other defendants to
try to push their cases further toward trial (and thereby raise the cost of processing those cases) in order to get better deals. Indeed, far from wishing to
screen out innocents at a late stage, the prosecutor's probable strategy is to
punish defendants who force a great deal of trial preparation before they
plead. 127 Refusals to bargain may, in short, be good signals, but prosecutors
have strong incentives not to pay attention to them.
C. The Effects of the Information Problem
In the absence of reliable signals that they can afford to take seriously,
prosecutors have no viable option other than to ignore claims of innocence.
That is not to say that they do not care about those claims. On the contrary,
prosecutors must take into account the odds of acquittal when making plea
offers. Thus, defendants who can at T, point to evidence that supports their
innocence claims can either obtain a dismissal or a favorable plea offer. But
in assessing the odds of acquittal, the prosecutor has strong incentives to
consider only the information available to her at the time of bargaining, and
not to investigate or otherwise credit the defendant's claims.

127. To be sure, Heumann notes that on some occasions, defense attorneys were able to extract

significant concessions by pushing the case toward trial. Id. at 73-74. The most plausible explanation for
these cases-the only one that is consistent with the dominant pattern of punishing defense attorneys for
stringing out the litigation-involves a form of prosecutorial bluffing. If P recognizes at T that her case
,
is weak, she may nevertheless take a strong bargaining position in the hope that defense counsel
will relent
and accept the too-harsh deal. A shrewd defense lawyer may call P's bluff in such a case, prompting P to
make last minute concessions in order to avoid a trial. The key to this interaction is P's belief in the
weakness of her case at T, In the more typical case, where P's assessment at T is more favorable, an
,
aggressive defense strategy, one that involves filing a series of motions, pushing the case toward trial, or
both, yields only prosecutorial retaliation. Id. at 122-26.
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This notion might seem obvious, and not terribly troubling. Of course
prosecutors do not credit claims of innocence in plea bargaining; if they did,
they would simply dismiss charges. But our analysis applies more broadly. For
all the reasons that some subset of innocent defendants cannot signal that they
are innocent, they also cannot signal that they might be. Prosecutors have an
incentive to avoid any price adjustment that might lead to strategic behavior
by guilty defendants. Moreover, the argument applies not only to defendants
who are guilty of nothing, but also to defendants who are guilty of a crime less
serious than the one charged. 1" That is, the theoretical argument has been
framed in absolute terms, but it applies to relative differences as well. Finally,
valid innocence claims are not limited to the (probably rare) cases in which the
government charged the wrong person; they include cases in which the defendant committed the criminal act, but did so under duress, in self-defense, or
without the requisite intent. Such cases may not be the norm, but they are far
from unknown. In short, this pooling phenomenon may affect a substantial
number of cases. Needless to say, they are the cases that raise the strongest
concerns about fairness and accuracy.
To put it differently, the theoretical argument suggests that separating the
innocent from the guilty-the central task of the system-takes place primarily
at two stages: precharging and trial. Those innocent defendants who are not
screened out at the first stage may be forced to wait for the last; plea bargaining, the intermediate stage, will afford them little relief. That is so because the
prosecutor's incentive is to offer an innocent defendant the same deal that she
would offer a guilty defendant with the same case file-with no downward
innocence adjustment. This strategy permits the prosecutor to maximize net
sentences over the population of defendants by capturing all the available rents
from those defendants who are guilty. No doubt some percentage of innocent
defendants who would have accepted a low-price offer will refuse the deal and
win acquittals after a trial. These losses, however, are likely to be less than the
losses to the prosecutor from underpricing the plea to the much greater number
of factually guilty defendants. Since the prosecutor must bear one set of losses
or the other, she is likely to choose the cheaper alternative and pool her risks.
From a defendant's perspective, the picture is similarly troubling. Bargaining defendants are, in effect, purchasing insurance from prosecutors, insurance
against the risk of conviction and a high post-trial sentence. The pool of
defendants includes high-cost insureds (guilty defendants whose conviction is
extremely likely) and low-cost insureds (including innocent defendants whose
conviction is much less likely). But the latter cannot effectively separate
themselves from the former. They therefore must either buy the high-cost
128. The theoretical argument for those guilty of lesser offenses differs in one respect from the pure
innocence cases: if the defendant is guilty of something and so signals to the prosecutor, any reputational
benefits that may accrue from a clean record are dissipated. Thus, defendants who are guilty, but of lesser
offenses than those charged, may suffer the greatest disadvantage from the pooling phenomenon.
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insurance or else self-insure by going to trial. Because of risk aversion, many
of them will likely buy the insurance notwithstanding its high price, leading
to a misallocation of criminal punishment
The structural dynamic of plea bargaining leads, then, to a single variable
contract in which all defendants-whether guilty or innocent-are offered a
sentence based upon the prosecutor's estimate of the strength of the case at the
time of bargaining plus the expected savings in transaction costs from shifting
prosecutorial efforts to pleas rather than trials. Our analysis suggests that such
a contract is inefficient because it fails to exploit the risk reduction potential
of defendants' private knowledge. But the inefficiency is actually worse than
it may appear. Innocent defendants are probably highly risk averse relative to
guilty defendants. And the high cost of adjudication, coupled with its disproportionate allocation to the government, means that the gap between post-trial and
bargained-for sentences will be greater than ordinary discounting might suggest.
In other words, due in part to adjudication costs, the risk from going to trial
is likely to be substantial, not because the probabilities of conviction are altered,
but because the impact of conviction is so great. 129 Risk averse defendants,
meaning in part innocent ones, might well avoid that risk even at the cost of
accepting a deal that treats them as if they were certain to be convicted at
1 30
trial.
Of course, this may not be much of a problem for the innocent defendant
with a clean record who is charged with a very low-level crime. The likely
post-trial sentence for such a defendant is minimal, so the plea offer will likely
be quite favorable.131 But many crimes for which innocents might be charged
are not so minor. A mail fraud or insider trading defendant may not have had
the requisite intent, though the preliminary evidence may not convey that fact.
Because such crimes are often committed by people with clean records,
the absence of a bad record will not itself signal innocence. The same is true
in murder prosecutions. The high acquittal rate in homicide cases-about thirty
percent, almost double the rate for felony cases generally 13 _-might suggest,
among other things, that an unusually high number of innocents are charged
with murder.1M This inference makes some intuitive sense, since the crime
129. The risk is a function of two factors: the probability of the result times its impact. Relative to the

plea, the argument here is that the impact of conviction is greater for D because the post-trial sentence will

reflect adjudication costs that could have been saved by bargaining. In other words, the effect of adjudication
costs is to increase the variance of the risk, and thus to visit it on risk averse parties.
130. See Grossman & Katz, supranote 100, at 755-56 (where innocent defendants are more risk averse
than guilty ones, plea bargaining is not effective separation device).
131. To put it another way, the prosecutor's incentive to 'push" such cases is slight since the post-trial
punishment will be so low. Consequently, favorable offers to defendants will carry little cost to prosecutors.
132. DAvID WEISBURD ET AL., CRIMES OF THE MMDLE CLASSES 66-67 & thl. 3.4 (1991) (white-collar
criminals are approximately half as likely as other criminals :o have prior arrests or convictions).
133. See 1990 SOURcEBoOm, supra note 1, at 526 tbl. 5.51.

134. The reasoning is as follows: if acquittal is correlated (albeit not perfectly) with innocence, and

there is an unusually high percentage of acquittals in murder cases, then there may be an unusually high

number of innocent defendants on trial for murder. Since risk aversion should lead many (perhaps most)
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135
is one that is often committed by people who are not career criminals
(hence, a generally law-abiding life will not convincingly signal innocence if
the circumstances suggest otherwise), and the victim, by definition, cannot
describe what happened. Such defendants cannot, at the plea stage, signal their
higher likelihood of acquittal; they must take the same contract offered to guilty
(and more-likely-to-be-convicted) defendants. Adjudication costs, together with
simple discounting, produce a contract with a substantial sentencing gap. And
a risk averse innocent defendant may be more likely to take the deal than a
guilty one because for the innocent, bearing the risk of the higher post-trial
sentence is more costly.

III. THE INNOCENCE PROBLEM AND PLEA BARGAINING DOCTRINE
Bargain theory helps identify what we believe to be the most problematic
feature of plea bargaining: the dynamic of the parties' interaction makes it
harder for innocent defendants to identify themselves. The normative question
is what ought to be done about that problem at the level of legal doctrine.
The contemporary debate over plea bargaining has tended to push toward
one of two polar alternatives for resolving real or perceived problems with the
system. The first option, and the one implicitly adopted by current participants
in the process, is to maintain the status quo. That is, the system might simply
tolerate the innocence problem. The structural dynamic of plea bargaining may
disadvantage innocent defendants, but most defendants are not innocent. (And
even some innocent defendants are unaffected by the structural problem, since
they can effectively signal their innocence in police interrogation, or by pointing
to evidence that corroborates their claim at T1.) Thus, the problem discussed
above does not infect most bargains. In the typical case, the gains from trade
are straightforward--savings in adjudication costs-and the bargaining dynamic
is relatively uncomplicated. The prosecutor's reservation price reflects the fact
that adjudication costs fall most heavily on the government. This in turn lowers
the price of pleas, which makes pleas a good deal for guilty defendants. For
all the reasons discussed in Part I, these typical cases appear to be paradigmatic
value-enhancing bargains of the sort that the system ought to enforce. Moreover, innocent defendants still have the trial process to fall back on. This
argument for the status quo is normatively plausible, however, only if the

innocent defendants to plead guilty, even given a substantial acquittal rate, the pool of all murder defendants
probably includes an unusually high number of innocents.
Of course, there are other variables that help explain the phenomenon: juries may be particularly loath
to convict in close cases where the penalties are likely to be steep, and proof of guilt is particularly hard
for the government where (as is usually the case in homicide prosecutions) there are no witnesses and the
evidence is circumstantial. Our point is only that innocent defendants are probably a substantial factor in
the acquittal statistics, not that they are the only factor.
135. See RICHARD N. HARRIs, VIOLENT CRIME INVIRGINtA 30 thl. 12 (1989) (showing that 29% of
convicted murderers had no prior record).
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problem is intractable. If there are feasible ways of improving the ability of
innocents to separate themselves from guilty defendants, the system should
adopt them.
The alternative that most legal academics appear to support is to abolish
plea bargaining altogether. If the innocence problem is sufficiently great, it
might justify abandoning the system of consensual allocation. After all, in other
respects the rules of the game are stacked in favor of innocent defendants-the
"beyond a reasonable doubt" standard of proof is the most obvious example,
though far from the only one. Perhaps the same should be true here: if plea
bargaining makes innocent defendants worse off, it should be eliminated.
Unfortunately, abolition would likely only worsen innocent defendants'
plight. In order to accommodate the dramatic increase in trials, the trial process
itself would have to be truncated, as Stephen Schulhofer's famous discussion
of the Philadelphia process shows. The mini-trials that took the place of
bargaining in Philadelphia were brief affairs, most lasting no more than an hour;,
the pretrial preparation on both sides was minimal. 136 Altering the trial process in this way necessarily increases the error rate (unless our current trial
system is nonsensical), meaning that it raises the rate at which innocent defendants are convicted. That, in turn, alters prosecutors' incentives when making
decisions about which cases to take to trial. Indeed, it may alter police incentives when making arrests. Police officers and prosecutors alike can afford to
be less careful in screening their cases if the trial "backstop" becomes more
casual.
In short, prohibiting plea bargaining would likely raise the proportion of
innocents who are convicted of crimes. The problem of defendants' inability
to use their private information in bargaining would disappear since bargaining
would disappear. But if the trial process itself led to a substantially higher rate
of conviction of innocent defendants, the ex ante position of those defendants
would not improve.
There is a third possible solution, however, one that the contemporary
discussion largely ignores.137 A developed body of law defines and regulates
plea bargains. That law might be adjusted in ways that (if only at the margin)
facilitate the separation of innocent defendants from guilty ones at the bargaining stage. This approach depends, necessarily, on an understanding of how
particular rules affect the bargaining dynamic between prosecutors and defendants. Conventional constitutional analysis, of the sort that dominates the plea
bargaining literature, cannot provide such an understanding. But contract
reasoning can. The same analytic tools that suggest the normative acceptability
136. See Schulhofer, Plea Bargaining,supra note 4, at 1055-57.
137. For a notable exception to the pattern in the literature of ignoring incremental reform, see McCoy
& Mirra, supranote 21, at 926-41 (suggesting, inter alia, elimination of habitual criminal statutes, limitations
on size of disparity between post-trial and post-plea sentences, and various mandatory information transfers
to defendants).
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of plea bargaining as a general matter and also suggest the difficulty the
bargaining dynamic creates for innocent defendants can help to identify possible
legal moves to reduce that difficulty.
A. First-Best Solutions
Obviously, the best reform would be one that attacks the innocence separation problem directly. The problem arises from two facts: innocence claims are
not readily testable, and trials are expensive. Because of the first fact, guilty
defendants will try to copy any signal by which innocent defendants seek to
identify themselves. Prosecutors must therefore offer the innocent the same deal
as the guilty. Because of the second fact, that deal will include a high price for
going to trial.
Any direct solution must change one of these two conditions. But such
changes have enormous costs of their own. Consider the inability to test
innocence claims at acceptable cost. That problem is, to a substantial degree,
a function of lawyers' participation in the process,1 38 together with the bar
on compelled questioning of defendants. 139 Lawyers permit defendants both
to refine their stories and to avoid traps."14 And the privilege against selfincrimination allows defendants to communicate with the government solely
through counsel. These two basic entitlements combine to make it far easier
for guilty defendants to plausibly claim innocence, or at least partial innocence.
The government's eagerness to question defendants before they meet with their
lawyers demonstrates the truth of this proposition. The virtue of such questioning is precisely that defendants' stories are less likely to have been carefully
planned, and hence slip-ups (plus simple surrenders) are more easily induced.14 This effect is particularly strong if the police are allowed to use
deceptive interrogation tactics of the sort that might trick guilty defendants into
incriminating themselves. 42
Getting rid of lawyers at the plea bargaining stage would thus help innocent
defendants separate themselves, since their claims of innocence would be
somewhat harder to copy. But eliminating lawyers would also (obviously)
introduce the potential for sharp practices by the government. Defendants do
138. The Sixth Amendment gives defendants a right to counsel at all "critical stages" of the process,
beginning with the initiation of formal adversary proceedings. Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967);
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The standards that apply to waiver of counsel ensure that, as
a practical matter, lawyers will virtually always be a part of the plea negotiation process. See Stuntz, supra
note 23, at 826-27 & nn.186-87.
139. Technically, that bar dates at least to Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936), which held that
the admission into evidence of involuntary confessions violates due process. As a practical matter, it has
existed only since Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
140. This is, in a sense, the theme of Kenneth Mann's insightful book on the defense of white-collar
crime. See MANN, supra note 116.
141. This is the only plausible explanation for the fact that, even after Miranda, the police continue
to obtain confessions in a large number of cases.
142. For an explanation and defense of such tactics, see Stuntz, supra note 23, at 805-18, 822-25.
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not know what legal claims they might have; they might therefore fall prey to
bargains that fail to account for legally valid defenses or entitlements to suppress certain types of evidence.143 The argument in Part I-that plea bargaining does not raise serious duress or unconscionability concerns-depends, to
a substantial degree, on the ability of defense counsel to prevent government
overreaching. Were defense counsel absent, the picture would change in ways
that might hurt innocent defendants most of all.
For reasons we have already discussed, the same is true of the trial process.
That process is costly, in large part because of the many rules designed to
maximize innocent defendants' chances of acquittal. If the process is cheapened,
the error rate will rise, and prosecutors' selection of cases at the charging stage
will change accordingly. There is no reason to think such changes would make
innocent defendants as a whole better off.
B. Second-Best Solutions
Even though reform cannot eliminate the basic problem, it can help innocent defendants by increasing prosecutors' incentive to take account of the odds
of acquittal apartfrom defendants' private information. This is no small point.
Some (perhaps many) innocent defendants are unaffected by the bargaining
dynamic described in Part II, because they have important information corroborating their innocence claim at T1, information that should lead both sides to
discount the odds of conviction substantially. The law can best protect these
defendants by ensuring that this information is factored into the price of the
bargain. More to the point, defendants who are harmed by the pooling phenomenon will often have some corroborating information at T1: just as innocence
is correlated with favorable yet-to-be-discovered evidence, it is also correlated
with favorable evidence already known to the parties. At T1 , many defendants
may appear, say, sixty-percent likely to be convicted should the case go to trial.
Most of these defendants are guilty. But some are not, and for the reasons set
forth in Part II, they will find it hard to distinguish themselves from their guilty
counterparts. The discussion thus far suggests that the law may find it impossible to eliminate that problem. But it may nevertheless be able to improve these
defendants' welfare by ensuring that "sixty-percent cases" are priced differently
than "ninety-percent cases."
Of course, prosecutors already have an incentive to price cases according
to expected outcomes, based on the information available to them at the time
of bargaining. But current law inexplicably dilutes that incentive in a number
of ways, encouraging prosecutors to treat close cases the same as clear ones,
and thereby harming innocent defendants unnecessarily. We have selected three
143. See id. at 830-31 (explaining why rules governing waiver of counsel are so much more stringent
at plea stage than at interrogation stage).
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such areas-the rules governing enforceability, mistake, and the fixing of posttrial sentences. In each, the law makes the problem of separating innocent from
guilty worse than it need be; in each instance, we suggest a fairly simple reform
that would ameliorate the problem.
The argument turns on the interaction between the legal rules and the
bargaining dynamic. Contract law is largely designed to facilitate fair and
efficient bargains. Unsurprisingly, then, looking to appropriate contract analogies turns out to be enormously helpful in identifying opportunities for productive change in the doctrine.
1. Enforceability
When defendants promise to plead guilty in return for government concessions and then do so, they are legally entitled to the concessions. 1" At the
same time, if the defendant fails to perform, the prosecutor need not perform
either.145 But while the exchange of promises is, to this extent, supported by
legal sanctions, plea bargains are not enforced according to standard, gardenvariety contract principles of offer and acceptance. As a consequence, defendants' ability to rely on government promises is much lower than in comparable
private settings.
The problem stems from two legal rules. The first holds that the bargain
is ordinarily not binding until the defendant actually pleads guilty. Thus, if the
prosecutor promises to recommend a ten-year sentence in exchange for a plea,
and the defendant agrees, either the prosecutor or the defendant may still cancel
the deal at any time prior to the defendant's performance. 46 The second rule
is related to the first: prosecutors may not bind judges. A prosecutor can
promise to recommend a given sentence (or sentencing range), but she cannot
guarantee that the defendant will actually receive that sentence. 47 The
judge148 alone decides the defendant's sentence, save for cases in which a
legislatively mandated sentence exists. 149 The most that can be done is to
condition the defendant's plea on the receipt of a particular sentence (meaning
that if the judge rejects the prosecutor's recommendation the plea is rescind-

144. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971). For the best discussion in the literature of what
this entitlement might mean in practice, see Peter Westen & David Westin, A Constitutional Law of
Remediesfor Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CAL. L. REV. 471 (1978).
145. Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504 (1984).
146. Id.; see also 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 100, § 20.2(e) (1984 & Supp. 1991). The only
exception is in cases where the defendant acted to his substantial detriment in reliance on the prosecutor's
promise. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e) (permitting prosecutor to issue either of two types of nonbinding
sentence recommendations, one that can be revised by court without notice to the defendant, and one that

can be revised only after giving defendant the opportunity to rescind his plea).
148. In some jurisdictions, juries decide sentences. However, judicial sentencing remains the norm.
149. To put it another way, the prosecutor is given essentially total discretion to define the charge,
but the judge (acting ex post) and legislature (acting ex ante) determine the sentence.
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ed),150 and this practice is discouraged or prohibited in many jurisdictions.151 The typical plea bargain is in fact an agreement by both sides to
present the case to the sentencing judge in a particular way-from the defendant's side, an agreement to plead guilty to specified offenses; from the government's side, a promise to say (or to avoid saying) particular things at sentencing. But the agreement is curiously one-sided: the defendant's plea is ordinarily
binding, while the prosecutor's words constitute mere advice that the court can
accept or ignore as it wishes.
Note the effect these rules have on innocent defendants. The current regime
basically invites judges to revise bargained-for sentencing recommendations
upward when recommended sentences seem unusually low. Yet if the prosecutor and defense counsel agree to recommend an unusually low sentence, that
recommendation may reflect the parties' estimation of the probability of
conviction (and perhaps the possibility of the defendant's innocence) should
the case proceed to trial.1 52 The prosecutor and defense attorney have far
better information about the probability of conviction than the judge, whose
knowledge of the case is limited to the papers the parties filed with the court.
Moreover, the prosecutor has an incentive not to disclose such concerns to the
judge, since the prosecutor does not wish to cast doubt on her own case before
the person who may try it should the bargain break down. The existing rules
thus make it harder for the parties to internalize any information that suggests
the possibility of the defendant's innocence-not simply the defendant's private
information. The judge who overturns bargains that seem too favorable to the
defense risks punishing precisely those defendants who least deserve it, and
precisely those who are victimized by the structural problem discussed in Part
II.
This effect stems from the failure to treat the prosecutor as a genuine party
to the plea bargain. The current regime treats the prosecutor's promise (even
if formalized) not as an "offer" that the defendant may "accept" and then
enforce, but as an invitation to negotiate, with the deal sealed only when the
parties go to court.' 53 The prosecutor's proposal, even if accepted, typically
does not define the price of the defendant's offense-the only obligation is that
the prosecutor mouth the right words at sentencing. The judge sets the price.
To put it differently, in contract terms the bargain is not really between the
150. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(4).
151. See Alschuler, TrialJudge's Role, supra note 4, at 1070-72 & n. 42, 45.
152. In Part II, we argued that bargains often will not reflect this probability. Our point here is only
that (1) they sometimes will, and (2) those occasions are likely to be particular targets for judicial upward
revision. Moreover, prosecutors will take account of objective information available to the government at
the time of negotiations, even though they will not ordinarily invest substantial effort in verifying defendants'
claims. And in some cases, the objective evidence will raise some doubt about the defendant's guilt. These
cases too are obvious candidates for low-probability-of-conviction pricing, and hence also candidates for
judicial upward revision.
153. Formally, the judge's approval is a condition precedent to the bargain. See Jones, supra note 12,
at 611, 613-14.
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defendant and the prosecutor, since the prosecutor can make only token commitments. The true contracting parties are the defendant and the judge. The
prosecutor acts as the judge's negotiating agent, but the judge retains the
authority to accept or reject his agent's work.' 54
This principal-agent model is useful in some contract settings, but it has
several fundamental problems in the plea bargaining context. Most obviously,
the prosecutor better understands the details of the particular negotiation than
the judge-that is, the prosecutor is much better positioned to know the odds
of acquittal, and hence to know whether a low-probability price is justified.
Moreover, the judge has a far poorer understanding of the opportunity cost of
going to trial than does his "agent," the prosecutor. In private settings, the
whole point of retaining final authority in the hands of the principal, even while
using an agent to negotiate the deal, is that the principal knows more than the
agent about alternative investments the firm might pursue if this deal is not
made. But in the plea bargaining setting, the party who knows the opportunity
cost of a bargaining breakdown is the prosecutor, not the judge. Whether the
bargain is a good one depends, in large part, on what the prosecutor (more
generally, the district attorney's office) can accomplish with the time saved by
avoiding a trial. That, in turn, depends on the range of arrests that are brought
to the office for prosecution, since those arrests define the prosecutor's options.
The prosecutor knows a good deal about this choice set; the judge knows little
55
or nothing.1
The only reason for not allowing the prosecutor to set the maximum
sentence as part of the plea bargain is that the prosecutor may sometimes
undervalue society's interest in punishing serious offenders. The premise that
judges are better than prosecutors at internalizing social interests in deterrence
and retribution seems to us implausible on its face.15 6 But even if our intuition
were false, the fact remains that prosecutors make binding decisions not to
pursue criminal punishment at all, and judges have no power to review such
154. Note too that the agent's negotiating authority is quite circumscribed. The defendant typically must
decide whether to plead guilty before the judge announces his sentence; that is, the principal in this threecornered bargain has the authority to set a price within a wide range, and the defendant agrees to plead
subject to that authority. See 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 100, § 20A(g), at 656 & n.137.
155. The mandatory nature of the plea bargaining rule makes this problem worse: the prosecutor cannot
make binding sentencing arrangements even if both she and the defendant wish to do so. This leads to costly
adaptive behavior on the part of plea bargaining participants. In some jurisdictions, for example, judges
become active participants in the bargaining process, either by signaling what sentences they will and will
not accept, or by dealing directly with defense counsel, thereby substituting their own bargaining for that
of their prosecutorial "agents." JoNFs, supra note 9, at 102-04, 202; Alschuler, TrialJudge'sRole, supra
note 4, at 1087-99. There is a sense in which this behavior is efficient, given the existing rule structure:
it reduces the risk that proposed bargains will be later rejected, and thereby promotes reliance on prosecutors' sentencing promises. But it plainly adds to the transaction costs of plea bargaining. And it may have
other undesirable consequences as well-for example, by becoming a participant in the bargaining process,

judges may lose their air of objectivity, an effect that, if sufficiently pervasive, might undermine faith in
the trial system.
156. We argue below that judges may better internalize defendants' interests; thus it may be desirable
to limit the prosecutor's ability to bind the government to minimum sentences.
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decisions."' In other words, if the prosecutor is, relative to the judge, a poor
agent for the public interest in law enforcement, s the proper response is a
system of judicial review of charging decisions (including decisions not to
charge). Absent such a regime, it seems odd to bar the prosecutor from fixing
a ceiling on the permissible sentence.
Moreover, if guarding against excessively low prosecutorial sentencing
offers is the reason for the nonenforcement rule, the rule may well be counterproductive. Under the current regime, defendants who plea bargain must bear
the risk that the judge will not follow the prosecutor's recommendation. That
risk cannot be cost free; the resulting contract price is more favorable to
defendants in order to compensate for the risk that the deal will be upset at
sentencing. This means prosecutors presumably recommend lower sentences
due to the rule that allows their recommendations to be overturned. This result
magnifies the disparity between the judge's view of the proper sentence and
the prosecutor's recommendation. That is, the rule that allows the judge to
overturn overly light sentencing recommendations tends to foster even lighter
sentencing recommendations. And given that innocent defendants are more
likely to be risk averse than guilty ones, the greater disparity between trial
sentences and plea sentences can only aggravate the innocence problem.
Enforcing prosecutors' sentencing promises would thus reduce (1) uncertainty,
(2) transaction costs, 59 and (3) the disparity between post-plea and post-trial
sentences.
These changes would plainly make innocent defendants better off. Currently, if a prosecutor recommends a given sentence in a given case, the judge may
either accept the recommendation or ignore it and give the defendant something
much worse. Moreover, the innocent defendant may refuse to deal and go to
157. See, e.g., Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375 (2d Cir. 1973);
Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 299.
158. See Schuihofer, CriminalJusticeDiscretion,supra note 4, for the most well-developed argument
that this is the case.
159. There is a related advantage to enforcing prosecutors' sentencing promises: doing so would
eliminate a large number of disputes over alleged government breach. It is common for defendants to claim,
after receiving a sentence higher than the one the prosecutor agreed to recommend, that the prosecutor did
not make her recommendation with sufficient force, or that she undermined it in some way. Naturally, the
defendant sees such behavior as a breach. In subsequent litigation, courts must determine just what a promise

to recommend a given sentence requires-a determination that is necessarily uncertain. See 2 LAFAVE &
ISRAEL, supranote 100, § 20.2(d), at 588-94. Moreover, the court upon finding a breach must decide what
remedy is appropriate. See Westen & Westin, supra note 144. There is no good answer to this remedial
problem. If the court orders specific performance-i.e., resentencing following a proper recommendation
by the government-the sentencing judge will necessarily be aware that the government was unenthusiastic
about its recommendation. Alternatively, rescinding the defendant's plea, the other possible remedy, may
be tantamount to acquittal, and hence may overcompensate for the breach.
These difficulties do not arise in cases where the prosecutor's promise is binding. There may be
ambiguous cases where it is unclear whether the prosecutor meant to offer a binding sentence or only a

recommendation, but workable default rules should make that line fairly easy to draw. And the remedial
issue disappears: if the prosecutor promised a five-year sentence, the defendant can get no more than the
five-year sentence. Sensible doctrine on enforceability would, in other words, simplify the doctrine on
remedies as well.
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trial, where (if convicted) his sentence will be worse still. Enforcing prosecutors' promises would eliminate the second of these options, and thereby reduce
the incidence of the third (by making prosecutors' promises more reliable).
Guilty defendants might benefit from enforcement as well, given the reduction
in transaction costs. But the biggest winners would be the innocent
2. Mistake
In all bargains, there is a risk that one party or the other may foolishly
agree to terms that do not promote self-interest. This risk affects guilty and
innocent defendants alike, but it disproportionately afflicts the innocent. If the
defendant is innocent, the probability of conviction must be substantially less
than one hundred percent, a fact that the price of the plea bargain ought to take
into account. But risk averse innocent defendants may accept bargains that treat
them not merely as probably guilty, but as certain to be convicted. Thus, when
an innocent defendant's lawyer erroneously prices her client's case, and negotiates a deal that presumes certain conviction, there is a good chance the bad deal
will be accepted. In short, mistakes in bargaining surely affect the whole
system, but are particularly likely to determine outcomes in cases where guilt
is in some question.
Contract law addresses the risk of mistake in two different ways. In the
occasional case in which a material mistake by one side either was or plainly
should have been known to the other side, the contract is voidable at the
instance of the mistaken party.' 6° In the mass of disputes, the mistaken party
bears the risk of his own errors-with one important twist. If the mistake was
an attorney's, the mistaken party can sue for legal malpractice, with the possibility of a damage recovery if the lawyer's error was causally related to the
loss.
Plea bargaining doctrine largely duplicates the first of these rules, but not
the second. Either party can void the bargain if the other engaged in misrepresentation or its functional equivalent. 161 In addition, the defendant is permitted
to rescind his plea if he can show that (1) his lawyer was constitutionally
ineffective, and (2) but for the lawyer's errors he would not have pled
160. It is worth emphasizing that this rule applies only in the unusual case; ordinarily, a mistake by
one party will not preclude enforcement of the contract. See, e.g., Anderson Bros. Corp. v. O'Meara, 306
F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1962); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 153-154 (1988).
In cases where the relevant information was gathered through what one might call protected investment, there is no duty to disclose. See Laidlaw v. Organ, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 178 (1817); Anthony T.
Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1978). The
familiar example is the geologist who buys land from a farmer knowing that there is oil under the land;
the geologist need not disclose this information to the farmer even though he knows the farmer believes

the land contains nothing of value. Cf.Saul Levmore, Securitiesand Secrets: Insider Tradingand the Law
of Contracts, 68 VA. L. REv. 117, 137-42 (1982) (arguing that in such cases, the geologist should perhaps
be allowed actively to deceive the farmer).
161. See 2 LAFAVE & ISRAEL, supra note 100, § 20.2(d), at 587-602.
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guilty.162 In practice, only truly atrocious lawyering leads to a judicial finding
of ineffective assistance in the guilty plea setting. 163 This is unsurprising,
since the governing Supreme Court decision states that relief is appropriate not
where the defendant might have struck a better deal, but only where he would
not have pled guilty at all. t 64 Because most attorney error affects the price

of the plea rather than its existence, most attorney error does not amount to
ineffective assistance. In short, aside from occasional instances of incredible
incompetence, it is not so much defense attorney error as government advantage-taking that determines whether a defendant can rescind his plea based on
mistake.
One might suppose that this regime makes good sense for the same reasons
that justify the contract doctrine on unilateral mistake. But there are structural
asymmetries in the plea bargaining context that are missing in the ordinary
contract setting. If a contracting party makes a bad deal because of an error by
his lawyer, he may not be able to void the contract, but he can sue the lawyer.
This provides valuable insurance against the kinds of bargaining errors that
lawyers might make. Criminal defendants who plea bargain have no such
option, not because the law forbids them to sue, but because guilty criminals
who think they should have gotten lighter sentences are paradigmatically
unsympathetic plaintiffs. That deficiency is compounded by another difference
between plea bargaining and other settings where lawyers bargain on behalf
of their clients: the defense attorney in a plea bargaining setting has a substantially lower market incentive to bargain well. A large proportion of criminal
defense counsel are court-appointed (indeed, many work for a public defender's
office); their future business does not depend on successful haggling with
prosecutors. Moreover, such attorneys are paid according to a fixed schedule,
so that good bargaining will not necessarily lead to higher fees. Of course, this
is not true of privately paid defense counsel. But even for them, the absence
of an effective malpractice option removes some incentive to avoid lazy or
otherwise deficient bargaining.

162. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985).
163. See Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in
Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 59, 80-83 (1986). There is one possible exception to
this statement. Some cases indicate that relief is available where defense counsel's error was partly the
government's fault. In ExpartePool, 738 S.W.2d 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987), for example, the prosecutor
told defense counsel that the defendant was eligible for habitual offender treatment based on the timing of
his past convictions; defense counsel accepted the prosecutor's statement as factually true, and accordingly
advised his client to accept the state's proposed bargain and plead guilty rather than face sentencing as an
habitual offender. Id. at 286. The prosecutor's statement was wrong, and the court found the defense counsel

constitutionally ineffective and awarded relief. Id. Though cast as an ineffective assistance decision, Pool
actually seems more like a commonsense application of unilateral mistake doctrine: the government could
easily have prevented the defendant's error (indeed, the government induced it), and the defendant was
accordingly excused from his bargain.
164. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. at 59 ("[In order to satisfy the 'prejudice' requirement [of ineffective
assistance doctrine], the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.").
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The absence of a credible malpractice threat, coupled with the way criminal
defense lawyers are hired and paid, surely raises the risk of attorney error in
bargaining. And it is hard for criminal defendants to take precautions against
such errors, harder than for most contracting parties. In the plea bargaining
setting, the difference between a good and bad deal depends on (1) knowledge
of likely trial outcomes, including the behavior of judges exercising their
sentencing discretion, and (2) a good sense of the going "market price" of the
relevant category of crime-i.e., the sentence usually assigned after a guilty
plea in similar cases. Defense lawyers are well positioned to have both kinds
of information. Criminal defendants are not-especially defendants who have
little prior exposure to the system, which includes those defendants who are
likeliest to be innocent.
All this argues for a more generous mistake or excuse rule in plea bargaining (on the defendant's side) than in ordinary contract cases. But regulating
mistake directly is hard, if not impossible. The problem is that one cannot
distinguish between good and bad bargaining by looking at the process by
which the lawyers reached their deal. A two-minute conversation with the
prosecutor in the hallway with only slight advance preparation may represent
evidence of sloppiness and sloth. Or it may be that defense counsel, who has
a great deal of experience in dealing with similar cases, knows the market price,
realizes that investigation is extremely unlikely to lead anywhere, and understands how to get to the best offer expeditiously.16 5 In a context where bargaining skill depends more on knowledge of information about other cases than
on case-specific preparation, it is hard to judge a defense attorney's perfor166
mance by his behavior in any one case.
The only feasible alternative is to review not process but outcomes. A
bargained-for sentence that substantially exceeds the norm for the crime is
probably due to some kind of defense attorney mistake; at the least, the bargain
requires some explaining. The judge is in a poor position to supervise the
bargaining process, but he is in a very good position to recognize unusually
high sentences. This is particularly true if high sentence recommendations are
caused by problems of information revelation that cause defendants' claims of
factual innocence to be discounted. Defense attorney mistakes and the inno165. This is consistent with Heumann's finding that novice defense attorneys over-bargain and are to
some degree punished for doing so by prosecutors and judges. HEUMANN, supra note 5, at 67-69.
166. Note how different plea bargaining is in this respect from trial. When deciding whether a lawyer
did a good job in a given trial, it is possible to look solely at what the lawyer did in that case-how he
prepared, which witnesses he called, how he argued to the jury, and so forth. When deciding whether aplea
bargain was well done or not, however, one would learn little from a transcript of the prosecutor-defense
attorney conversation. Instead, a sensible evaluation would require a great deal of other information, not

about the case at hand, but about other cases. This may be why ineffective assistance doctrine, which was
plainly fashioned with trials in mind, has not proved particularly useful in the plea setting.
For arguments that ineffective assistance doctrine has indeed failed in this setting, see Albert W.
Alschuler, PersonalFailure,InstitutionalFailure, and the Sixth Amendment, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc.
CHANGE 149, 154-55 (1986); Schulhofef, supra note 10, at 141-42.
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cence problem both argue for treating a bargained-for sentence as a ceiling, but
not a floor. Downward judicial revision should be, and generally is, available
at the judge's discretion. But the law should go further: downward discretion
should be encouragedwhenever the sentence is substantially above the "market
level" in the relevant jurisdiction.
Aggressive downward revision does have a problem: it adds to the transaction costs of bargaining. As with defendants and upward revision, a prosecutor
must be compensated for bearing the risk that the judge will throw out her deal;
also as with defendants, the obvious means of compensation is to alter the price
term of the bargain. Thus, discretionary downward revision would raise the
overall level of bargained-for sentences, and would reduce the total number of
bargains. But these effects should be much more limited than the seemingly
analogous effects of allowing upward revision. Notwithstanding defendants'
preference for risk taking, the prosecutor is probably less risk averse than the
defendant: because she has a portfolio of cases (and also, obviously, because
she does not personally serve the time), the prosecutor cares less about the
possibility that a given sentence will be reduced from ten years to five than the
defendant cares about it being raised from five years to ten. To put it differently, a wide variance in outcome in a particular case is less important to the
prosecutor because (unlike the defendant) it is the expected value of plea
bargains generally that determines her returns on bargaining. This means that
a dispersion of outcomes on the prosecutor's side of the bargain is not likely
to lead prosecutors to refuse to bargain altogether.
3. Background Prices and Duress
The scenario that most troubles critics of plea bargaining is the innocent
defendant who faces a life sentence if convicted at trial and is offered a plea
bargain at a recommended sentence of a few years. The huge disparity between
the post-trial sentence and the plea sentence presumably leads the defendant,
though innocent, to accept the deal. Frank Easterbrook rightly points out that
this story is not necessarily a condemnation of plea bargaining. The sentencing
differential may simply reflect a low probability of conviction (based on
evidence available to the government), or it may stem from limited prison space
in the relevant jurisdiction. In either of those cases, the defendant is much better
off with the offer than without it: a murder defendant who has a fifty-percent
chance of winning at trial wants a regime that allows the prosecutor to offer
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a ten-year sentence with a plea."6 The situation is a sad one, but preventing
the offer only makes it sadder.
The plea offer in such a case does not amount to duress. 168 But there is
a duress problem with large sentencing differentials in some types of cases, a
problem that may disproportionately harm innocent defendants. The best way
to get at the problem is to imagine an ordinary executory contract in which one
party aims to convert an uncertain future outcome into a certain present onethe same thing criminal defendants do when they bargain with prosecutors.
Suppose a buyer is trying to purchase a certain quantity of grain for delivery
in one year. There are two possible courses of action if the buyer does not
reach a deal with a particular seller. First, he can go to another seller. Second,
he can wait until closer to delivery and buy the grain on the spot market. Both
options act as a check on the seller: competitors prevent the seller from charging a monopoly price, and the existence of a spot market means that the seller's
price is constrained by expectations about the market's future performance.
The first constraint is absent in plea bargaining: prosecutors do not compete
for customers; 169 rather, they take those cases assigned to them. 170 Stephen
Schulhofer has emphasized this prosecutorial monopoly, arguing that it creates
a substantial potential for misbehavior. 171 Yet the absence of prosecutorial
competitors is not by itself a great problem because there is another check on
the prosecutor's ability to behave strategically, one that is roughly analogous
to the spot market. If the prosecutor wants to reach a bargain, she must offer
the defendant something better than the expected value of going to trial,
discounted for the defendant's risk aversion. 72
The prosecutor is thus in an odd position: she resembles a seller of grain
futures who has no direct competitors, but who must price her futures contracts
against the backdrop of a working spot market whose price is not within the
seller's control. If the outcomes generated by that market-here, trial verdicts
and sentences-amount to sensible social policy, the prosecutor's bargaining
behavior should be generally sensible as well, because those outcomes constrain
167. Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 320 (noting the problem of innocent defendants who face strong

government cases: "[i]t
would do defendants no favor to prevent them from striking the best deals they could
in such sorry circumstances"); Grossman & Katz, supra note 100, at 749 (viewing plea bargaining as an
insurance device for innocent defendants); Edward A. Ruttenberg, PleaBargainingAnalytically-TheNash

Solution to the Landes Model, 7 AM. J. CR114. LAW 323, 346-47 (1979) (arguing that innocent defendants
are better off with bargaining option as long as trial error rates are positive).
168. See supra text accompanying notes 30-38.
169. Though they do compete in other ways; that is, in a typical district attorney's office, a typical
prosecutor is constrained somewhat by the efficiency and winning percentages of his colleagues.
170. If a given defendant is displeased with the offer that a prosecutor has given him, he cannot simply
do business with another prosecutor he is stuck with whomever the district attorney's office assigns to his
case. The same is true, though in a slightly different sense, of the prosecutor if the bargain breaks down

she must either take the case to trial or let the defendant off; she cannot fob the case off on another
prosecutor. The analogue for the grain seller would be a world in which she must either reach agreement
with this particular buyer or give a certain amount of grain away.
171. Schulhofer, CriminalJustice Discretion,supra note 4, at 63-66.
172. For the best discussion of this tradeoffin the literature, see Easterbrook, supra note 36, at 311-17.
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the prosecutor's pricing decisions. It is also true, of course, that if post-trial
sentences are too long or too short, post-plea sentences will be as well, since
pleas are not competitively priced. Whether post-trial sentences are or are not
sensible is a matter of sentencing policy. Our point is that the prosecutor's
bargaining (and pricing) decisions are a function of that policy.
Despite the fact that defendants cannot switch prosecutors, then, the
prosecutor's pricing decisions seem to be constrained, just as the monopolist
futures seller is constrained by the spot market. But the constraint depends on
the prosecutor's inability to manipulate post-trial sentences. At first blush, one
might think such manipulation impossible. Prosecutors do not set post-trial
sentences; judges or juries do, within rules set by legislatures. Thus, every trial
arguably generates a sentence that represents a social judgment by disinterested
decisionmakers (some combination of legislators, judge, and jury) about the
optimal sentence for the relevant criminal episode. To the extent that plea
bargaining takes place against the backdrop of those judgments, the argument
goes, it really does look like the working spot market, efficiently constraining
the prosecutor's pricing decisions.
Manipulation is possible, however, when the social judgment in question
is categorical rather than individualized. The longstanding pattern of American
substantive criminal law is overbroad definition of crimes coupled with broad
prosecutorial and judicial discretion. That is, legislatures writing criminal codes
tend to be much more concerned with capturing all the behavior that they wish
to punish than with excluding all the behavior that they wish to leave alone.
This practice creates not only broad criminal liability, but also overlapping
crimes: a single episode may fall within the definition of several criminal
offenses, ranging from trivial misdemeanors to serious felonies. Moreover,
defendants can often be charged with more than one offense for what seems
like a single act. The system has historically compensated for this overbreadth
in two ways: (1) prosecutors have been given absolute discretion not to charge
anyone with any given crime, and (2) judges traditionally have had the discretion to assign sentences within a very wide range. The second protection is
critical. Without it-that is, in a world of fixed sentences that attach to particular charges-a prosecutor has the ability to determine not merely the charge,
but the post-trial sentence as well. This allows the prosecutor to inflict severe
punishment on defendants who, though their behavior may fit the terms of the
relevant criminal statutes, do not really deserve it (meaning that no disinterested
legislature or court would apply such punishment to those defendants in isola173
tion).
173. Note that in saying what defendants do and do not "deserve," we are not implicitly adopting any
normative theory of a "just sentence." Rather, our point is essentially descriptive: that there are defendants

who would receive X years in prison if the legislature were to sentence those defendants individually, but
would receive X + Y years under a mandatory sentencing statute enacted by the same legislature. This
gap-between the outcome under a politically responsive discretionary regime and a politically responsive
mandatory regime-is what we refer to as the difference between what the individual defendant "deserves,"
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This might not be much of a problem in a system that prohibits plea
bargaining. Prosecutors do not, after all, gain much by successfully trying petty
criminals for serious charges, personal score-settling aside.' 74 Thus, using
fixed or mandatory sentences might create some potential for sporadic arbitrariness by prosecutors (no doubt a bad thing), but it would not generate any
systematic distortions in the allocation of criminal punishment.
The picture is different, and more troubling, when plea bargaining is added
to the equation. Consider, for example, the facts of Bordenkircherv. Hayes. 75
Hayes was charged with uttering a forged check for $88.30. He had two prior
felony convictions, one for "detaining a female" (a sexual assault charge), the
other for robbery. He served a total of five years on the two earlier charges,
not counting probation time. Because of these two prior convictions, Hayes was
eligible (though barely) to be charged under Kentucky's habitual criminal
statute, which carried a mandatory sentence of life in prison. The prosecutor
offered to let Hayes plead guilty to a lesser charge and to recommend a fivecriminal.
year sentence. If Hayes refused, he would be charged as a habitual
1 76
Hayes refused the offer, and the prosecutor carried out his threat.
Suppose that Hayes' earlier convictions were fairly low-level felonies, a
possibility that would tend to explain the relatively light sentences he had
received. Suppose further that Kentucky's habitual criminal law had authorized
a sentence of anywhere from ten years to life. The judge's sentence for the
forgery charge would surely have fallen closer to the minimum than the maximum. And that conclusion is consistent with the decision the legislature made
when it passed the habitual criminal statute. Felonies encompass a wide range
of criminal behavior, the legislature made, at best, a roughly accurate categorical judgment. If the same legislators who passed the statute were to vote on
sentences case by case, many defendants who qualify for habitual criminal
sentencing would get far less than life in prison. This might imply that the
habitual criminal statute is irrationally overinclusive. The implication, however,
is too simplistic; the key point is that the legislature did not intend for the
statute to be applied to every offender who might fall within its terms. Rather,
the legislature implicitly relied on prosecutors to separate the wheat from the
chaff-to exercise their discretion not to pursue habitual criminal sentencing
for offenders who fell within the statute but seemed not to deserve such harsh
treatment. Bordenkirchermay well be such a case; that is, the legislature may
in the view of the responsible decisionmakers, and what he gets.
174. Actually, prosecutors do get one other benefit: publicity. This is important where the individual
being overpunished is generally thought by the public to be guilty of misconduct beyond the formal charges.
See David Pritchard, Homicide andBargainJustice:The Agenda-Setting Effect of Crime News on Prosecutors, 50 PUB. OPINION Q. 143 (1986).
175. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).

176. See id. at 359. The Kentucky statute provided for habitual criminal status for three felony
convictions; Hayes' low-level forgery constituted the necessary third charge. Interestingly, sometime after
Hayes' case was tried, Kentucky revised its statute to lower the sentence level and to reintroduce some

judicial discretion. Id. at 359 n.2.
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have expected that prosecutors would not charge people like Hayes under the
statute, though no enforcement mechanism backed up that expectation (because
judicial review of charging decisions would be too costly).
The Kentucky statute thus gave the prosecutor a good deal of bargaining
power over people like Hayes because it allowed him to threaten a sentence
that, absent the statute, would have been implausible.'" The prosecutor did
not employ this threat to raise the price of his offer, since he had no particular
incentive to overpunish low-level repeat offenders. But he did have an incentive
to increase the likelihood that his offer would be accepted-and that is how
he framed his bargaining strategy. The huge sentencing differential in Bordenkircher suggests that while the prosecutor may have been charging something
like a "market price" for the guilty plea, he was putting pressure on Hayes to
take the deal without further dickering. In a discretionary system, the choice
might have been between a recommended five-year sentence and a likely ten
or twelve years if the case went to trial. Given the statute, the choice was much
more stark: five years or life. Hayes might not have accepted that deal, but
every future defendant is likely to do so and do so quickly.
The contract analogy is economic duress, the lone gas station in the middle
of the desert that charges fifty dollars for a gallon of gas. Like the prosecutor
in Bordenkircher, the gas station usually gets its asking price, because the
difference between that price and the cost of going without (death in the desert)
is so high. But contract law has resolutely rejected the buyer's duress argument
in such cases, on the sensible theory that since the constraint on the buyer's
choices (no gas in the desert) was not produced by the seller's actions, the
buyer was better off with the offer than without iL 178 Imagine, however, that
the gas station owner goes further. Figuring that the buyer will kick and scream
and haggle for an hour, but will eventually agree to the seller's price, the seller
decides to cut the negotiation short by letting the air out of the buyer's tires
and offering to refill the tires if, but only if, the buyer pays the seller's asking
price for gas. The tactic may well be socially beneficial in a narrow sense. The
cost of deflating and reinflating the tires may be less than the transaction costs
that the gas station owner saved, and the owner may be right to conclude that
the parties would have reached the same deal anyway. The problem is that we
can never know whether that conclusion is correct, because the seller has
removed any remaining market constraint on her pricing. She has reduced
transaction costs only by artificiallyconstraining the buyer's choice.
The same is true of the prosecutor in Bordenkircher. What he gets from
threatening to invoke the habitual criminal statute is lower transaction costs:
most defendants in Hayes' position will speedily accept the five-year offer once
177. This is a common use of habitual criminal statutes in other countries as well as this one. See JOHN
F. KLEIN, LET'S MAKE A DEAL 101-04 (1976) (discussing how Canada's habitual criminal statute came
to be "[t]he most potent of all bargaining levers" the government used in plea negotiations).
178. See supra text accompanying notes 34-38.
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they realize that the prosecutor is not bluffing. That may be a good thing if the
prosecutor's charging decisions are good ones. But the defendant's eagerness
to bargain can change the nature of the charging decision. A prosecutor who
knows that even a weak case will generate an easy plea (because of the defendant's fear of an overlong post-trial sentence) has little incentive to separate
strong cases from weak ones. Of course, this behavior is somewhat constrained
by the political costs that fall on the prosecutor when she takes cases to trial
and loses them. If she follows this strategy, however, she need not try many
cases-just enough to make the threat credible-and she need only win a few
for the strategy to become quite credible. Quite obviously, the social costs of
this strategic behavior are exacerbated if among these defendants are those who
are factually innocent but unable to so signal during plea bargaining. Thus, a
defendant like Hayes (especially if innocent) would be better off if the prosecutor could not bargain at all: in that event, the prosecutor would probably drop
the recidivist charge, since she would get nothing out of it.
In short, where the legislature drafts broad criminal statutes and then
attaches mandatory sentences to those statutes, prosecutors have an unchecked
opportunity to overcharge and generate easy pleas, a form of strategic behavior
that exacerbates the structural deficiencies endemic to plea bargaining. Because
this difficulty arises from the conjunction of several factors, it is possible to
avoid it in any of several different ways.179 Reducing overbreadth in criminal
statutes is the most obvious possibility. If virtually all of the behavior that falls
within a given statute merits the mandatory sentence the legislature attaches,
then the strategic problem disappears. But reducing overbreadth has its costs:
it occupies prosecutors and courts with detailed elements of detailed crimes,
thereby increasing the expense of trial. Alternatively, one might do away with
the type of mandatory sentencing used in Bordenkircher.This too can be costly.
Legislatures might feel that politically unresponsive judges are too lenient. If
the legislatures are right, mandatory sentencing is a valuable corrective. Indeed,
it is the only means by which society can prevent an unelected8 0 judiciary
from thwarting its will.
But solving the Bordenkircherproblem does not require the elimination of
all mandatory sentencing; the problem stems only from mandatory sentences
that attach to overbroad criminal statutes. A different type of system, one that
uses more complex formulas, as opposed to the mechanical attachment of a

179. One could argue that the Bordenkircher problem justifies dispensing with plea bargaining
altogether. This option has something of a baby-and-bathwater difficulty, however, since cases like
Bordenkircher are likely to be a fairly small minority of the overall docket. After all, the most common
complaint about plea bargaining outside academic circles is that it leads to underpunishment If Hayes were

the typical defendant, that sentiment surely would not be so widespread. Absent some showing that the
pricing/duress problem is otherwise unsolvable, or that it infects at least a large minority of criminal cases,
abolition of plea bargaining seems too extreme a response.
180. Where judges are elected, the case for mandatory sentencing is much weaker.
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given number of months or years to a given statute, would be much harder for
prosecutors to manipulate because it would generate far less overbreadth.
Such a system presently exists. The federal sentencing guidelines,"' for
all the criticism they have attracted,' 82 have largely succeeded in both drastically reducing judicial sentencing discretion and preventing prosecutors from
imposing (or threatening) unintended criminal liability on marginal defendants
who fall within broad statutes. The guidelines accomplish this by using formulas that focus on the presence or absence of numerous aggravating and mitigating factors, and by gearing sentences to the harm caused by the particular
criminal event. Drug defendants, for example, are sentenced (in part) according
to the amount they possessed, not solely according to which statute they
violated. By drawing more lines, the guidelines diminish overbreadth' 83
Of course, the sentencing guidelines may have other problems-in particular, they may make bad policy choices about particular crimes. But that is a
problem of sentencing policy, one that will exist whether plea bargaining exists
or not. In plea bargaining terms, the guidelines suggest a way of avoiding both
judicial arbitrariness and prosecutorial advantage-taking. When combined with
the other reforms we have suggested in this part, they offer a useful model for
a system that provides sentencing predictability without generating strategic
bargaining.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The central problem with both sides of the plea bargaining debate is the
same: they do not take contract seriously enough. Both at the level of broad
abstraction-is plea bargaining defensible in principle?-and at the level of
doctrinal detail-how and when should prosecutorial promises be enforced?---contract law and theory have a great many useful insights for this
pervasive, and pervasively criticized, practice. At the broadest level, contract
181. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3559,3561-3566,3571-3574,3581-3586 (1988), and 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998
(1988)); U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1992).

182. The most vociferous critics are the judges, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines
Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CPJM. L. REv. 161 (1991), for whom the guidelines represent
a significant loss of authority. Academics have been largely critical as well. See Albert W. Alschuler, The
Failureof Sentencing Guidelines: A Pleafor Less Aggregation,58 U. Cai. L. REV. 901 (1991); Proposed
Sentencing Guidelines for United States Courts, 52 Fed. Reg. 3920, 3986 (1987) (dissenting view of
Commissioner Paul H. Robinson).
183. Of course, there is still some overbreadth; it is easy to come up with horror stories in which two
incidents that yield very different culpability judgments nevertheless get the same sentence under the
guidelines. See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 182, at 918-24. But there are three responses to those horror
stories. First, most of them stem from bad sentencing policy judgments rather than overbreadth. Second,
similar horror stories could be told in discretionary sentencing jurisdictions, only there the difference would
be produced not by law, but by acts of judicial discretion. The relevant question is not whether the
guidelines are perfect, but whether they are better than the alternative. Third and finally, the degree of
overbreadth under the guidelines is of a much lesser magnitude than the overbreadth generated by mandatory
recidivist statutes of the sort involved in Bordenkircher.
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provides a framework for thinking about when consensual allocation ought to
be permitted. That framework offers a fairly clear answer to the most basic
questions policymakers (legislative or judicial) might want answered. In contract
terms, plea bargains do not amount to duress; they are not, in general, unconscionable; they do not have the key characteristics of slavery contracts; and they
are distributionally fairer than the likely alternative. Given the range of areas
where our legal system tolerates (indeed, subsidizes) consensual allocation, it
is hard to argue that contract is impermissible here. Seeing plea bargaining as
contract thus helps one understand why the lawyers and judges who engage in
and regulate the practice seem so comfortable with it.
But while consensual allocation has the same virtues here as elsewhere, it
has an important flaw, one that infects not only plea bargaining but many other
features of the criminal justice system. Innocent defendants have a hard time
signaling their innocence in ways that guilty defendants cannot copy. This is
not true of all stages in the process-police interrogation, for example-but it
is true of plea negotiations. The upshot is that prosecutors have good reason
to underestimate the odds that any given defendant might be innocent. This
might not be a problem if trials were perfect, but of course they are not. And
the consequences of this structural difficulty are likely to be substantial because
of innocent defendants' risk aversion, a characteristic that may lead them to
accept deals that do not discount for the possibility of acquittal. Understanding
the bargaining dynamic of plea negotiations thus helps explain the discomfort
so many outside observers feel about them.
Current legal doctrine not only fails to solve that structural problem (solutions may not exist); it makes the problem worse. By failing to enforce prosecutors' sentencing promises, the law encourages courts to raise sentences in
precisely those cases where the defendant is most likely to be innocent. By
underprotecting against defense attorney error, the law increases the chances
of risk averse innocent defendants accepting deals that treat them as certain
convictions. And by permitting prosecutorial manipulation of broad mandatory
sentencing statutes, the doctrine reduces prosecutors' incentives to separate
innocent from guilty defendants at the charging stage. All these effects are
unnecessary. By following appropriate contract models, one can devise different
rules that reduce the harm to innocent defendants and meanwhile reduce
transaction costs and inefficiency for everyone else.
The puzzle is that these systemic doctrinal problems have persisted so long,
with so little attention. The reason, we think, has to do with the nature of the
plea bargaining debate. Though it has long been understood that plea bargaining
is a species of contract, the debate about it has been framed not in the language
of bargains, but chiefly in the language of rights. That may have something to
do with its either-or character: either the defendant's rights trump the bargain
or the rights do not apply; either plea bargaining is wholly impermissible or
it raises no constitutional (read: important) issue. Rights rhetoric has led to a
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great deal of discussion of whether plea bargaining is a good thing, but little
attention to what the law that surrounds it ought to look like.
The time has come to put rights talk to one side and view plea bargaining
through the lens of contract. Contract makes the positive reactions of plea
bargaining participants seem sensible, for plea bargains are indeed paradigmatically value-enhancing bargains. Contract makes the disquiet of the critics seem
sensible too, since the bargaining dynamic shortchanges the innocent. And
contract offers a range of second-best solutions, doctrinal reforms that can help
prosecutors and defendants alike. These kinds of solutions may be less interesting than grand constitutional theory. In this context, they may also be more
useful.

